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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: THE
"DOUBLE WHAMMY" OF MANDATORY
INDEMNIFICATION UNDER DELAWARE LAW
IN WALTUCH v. CONTICOMMODITY
SERVICES, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Directors and officers have become increasingly concerned with the
potential for personal liability arising from their status with the corpora-
tion.' Consequently, the availability of indemnification and other liability
limiting mechanisms for corporate directors and officers has become an
important topic in corporate law.2 States have responded to this concern
by enacting statutes intended to limit the exposure of directors and of-
ficers to personal liability.3 Typically, these state efforts include enactment
1. For a discussion of the director and officer personal liability concern, see
infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
2. For a general discussion of director and officer liability, see PAT K. CHEW,
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY (1993 & Supp. 1995); MORTIMER FEUER, PER-
SONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (1961); 2 WILLIAM E.
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DiREcroRs (5th
ed. 1993); MICHAEL A. SCHAEFTLER, THE LIABILrTIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION
AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (1976); Joseph W. Bishop,
Jr., New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 72 DUKE LJ. 1153 (1972) [hereinafter Bishop, New
Problems]; Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter Bishop, Sitting Ducks]; Donald E. Pease, Indemnification Under Section 145 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167 (1978); E. Norman Veasey
et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnifi-
cation, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987).
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (1994) (providing voluntary
inclusion of provision in corporation's certificate of incorporation limiting or elim-
inating liability of directors to corporation and shareholders under certain circum-
stances); id. § 145(a)-(b) (permitting indemnification of directors and officers
provided person acted in good faith and in manner individual reasonably believed
to be in best interests of corporation); id. § 145(c) (requiring indemnification of
directors and officers who have been successful on merits or otherwise in defend-
ing against action or claim). Delaware has erected a tripartite statutory scheme to
provide directors and officers with protection from personal liability. SeeVeasey et
al., supra note 2, at 399 (discussing Delaware's "three-legged stool" of protection,
including limited liability, indemnification, and director and officer insurance).
The first branch of protection is provided by § 102(b) (7), which allows corpora-
tions to limit or even eliminate director and officer liability for certain breaches of
fiduciary duty in their certificate of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b) (7). The second branch of protection in Delaware is provided by § 145
which empowers corporations to indemnify directors and officers for legal ex-
penses incurred in a broad range of circumstances and requires such indemnifica-
tion in other circumstances. Id. § 145(a)-(c). The final branch of protection is
provided by § 14 5 (g), which allows corporations to purchase and maintain direc-
(223)
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of indemnification statutes that empower corporations to indemnify their
directors and officers for expenses incurred in legal proceedings and,
in some instances, requiring such indemnification. 4 In Delaware, the
statutory authorization for corporate indemnification is found in § 145
of the Delaware Code. 5 Recently, in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services,
tor and officer liability insurance policies for their directors and officers. Id.
§ 145 (g). For a thorough discussion of Delaware's statutory framework for protect-
ing directors and officers from personal liability, see A. Gilchrist Sparks III et al.,
Indemnification, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Limitations of Director Lia-
bility Pursuant to Statutory Authorization: The Legal Framework Under Delaware Law, in
PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
1990, at 941, 948-60 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 696,
1990) and Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 399.
4. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 10-850 to -858 (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-
850 (Michie 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-
771 to -778 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0850 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-850 to -
859 (1996); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.75 (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-37-1
to -15 (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE §§ 490.850-.858 (1995); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 721-726 (Consol. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-50 to -58 (1995); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1741-1746 (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-8-500 to -580 (Law Co-
op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-501 to -509 (1996); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.02-1 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-697 to 877 (Michie 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.08.500-.590 (West 1995); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9
(1996).
Generally, indemnification under these statutes can be categorized as either
permissive or mandatory. CHEW, supra note 2, at 231 ("The statutes typically distin-
guish between (1) indemnification that the corporation is required by law to pro-
vide, called mandatory indemnification; [and] (2) indemnification that the
corporation is authorized but not required to provide, called permissive indemnifi-
cation .... "). Permissive indemnification provisions grant corporations the discre-
tionary power to indemnify their directors and officers. Id. Mandatory
indemnification provisions require corporations to indemnify their directors and
officers under certain circumstances. Id. For a discussion of permissive and
mandatory indemnification, see infra notes 61-135 and accompanying text.
5. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (permitting, and in some instances, requir-
ing Delaware corporations to indemnify directors, officers and others for expenses
incurred in wide variety of legal proceedings). For a thorough discussion of corpo-
rate indemnification, see R. FRANKLIN BALoTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELA-
WARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.12-4.18, at 180-200.6
(1985 & Supp. 1988); JOSEPH W. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE (1982 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter
BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE]; CHEW, supra note 2; RALPH C. FERRARA
ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 12 (1995);
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 281-333; SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2; EDWARD P.
WELCH & ANDREWJ. TuREzvN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW:
FUNDAMENTALS 241-52 (1996); S. Samuel Arsht, Indemnification Under Section 145 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 176 (1978); Joseph F. John-
ston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33
Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978); FredericJ. Klink et al., Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under
State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAW. 109 (1972); Joseph P. Monteleone
& Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An
Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAW. 573 (1996); Sparks et al., supra
note 3. For an analysis of corporate indemnification under the NewJersey statute,
see Joseph E. Irenas & Ted Moskowitz, Indemnification of Corporate Officers, Agents,
and Directors: Statutory Mandates and Policy Limitations, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117
[Vol. 42: p. 223
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Inc.,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defined
the parameters of indemnification powers and duties under § 145. 7
This Note discusses the power and, in some instances, the duty of a
corporation to indemnify its directors and officers under § 145 of the Del-
aware Code.8 Part II briefly summarizes the relevant facts and legal issues
presented to the Second Circuit in Waltuch.9 Part III discusses the devel-
opment of indemnification under Delaware law and attempts to define the
parameters of § 145.10 Part IV then provides a summary and critical analy-
sis of the Second Circuit's opinion and construction of § 145 in Waltuch,
finding it to be in accord with § 145 as it has been interpreted by courts
and commentators.1 1 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the Second
Circuit's opinion, concluding that in the wake of Waltuch, corporations
entering into settlement agreements on behalf of their directors or of-
ficers should carefully consider the principles set forth in Waltuch when
structuring those agreements in order to avoid the "double whammy" of
mandatory indemnification. 12
II. WALTUCH V. CONTICOMMODITY SERVICES, INC.
Famed silver trader Norton Waltuch served as Chief Metals Trader
and Vice-President for Conticommodity Services, Inc. ("Conti"), trading
silver for the firm's clients as well as for himself.1 3 In late 1979, Waltuch
(1984). For a further discussion of § 145, see infra notes 61-135 and accompanying
text.
6. 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
7. For a discussion of the facts and issues presented in Waltuch, see infra notes
13-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion and analysis of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Waltuch, see infra notes
133-204 and accompanying text.
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (providing corporations with broad
power to indemnify directors and officers); id. § 145(c) (requiring corporations to
indemnify directors and officers when they have successfully defended against ac-
tion or claim). It should be noted that § 145 also applies to claims for indemnifica-
tion by employees and agents as well as directors and officers. See id. § 145(a)-(b)
(granting corporation power to indemnify "director, officer, employee or agent of
the corporation"); id. § 145(c) (requiring corporations to indemnify "a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation" under some circumstances). Be-
cause this Note is primarily concerned with director and officer liability and in-
demnification, its discussion of § 145 will refer only to directors and officers.
9. For a discussion of the facts and legal issues presented to the Second Cir-
cuit in Waltuch, see infra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.
10. For a general discussion of indemnification under § 145 of the Delaware
Code, see infra notes 61-135 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion in Waltuch, see infra notes
136-97 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second Circuit's opin-
ion in Waltuch, see infra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of the Second Circuit's decision in Waltuch
and some practical suggestions in light of the opinion, see infra notes 198-207 and
accompanying text.
13. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1996).
Waltuch was the account executive in charge of Conticommodity's larger accounts.
1997] NOTE
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heavily invested his domestic and foreign clients in silver and silver futures
contracts. 14 During that period, the price of silver rose at a dramatic rate
to unprecedented levels. 15 In a manner characteristic of many runaway
markets, this all came to an abrupt close in March 1980, on the now infa-
mous "Silver Thursday," when prices plummeted and the silver market col-
lapsed 16 resulting in huge losses for both institutional and individual
investors alike.1 7 Shortly thereafter, angry investors brought numerous
suits against both Waltuch and Contijointly, alleging fraud, market manip-
Karen W. Arenson, Senate Hearing Is Told of Foreign Silver Losses, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1980, at D2. Waltuch frequently made trips to the Commodity Exchange floor's
trading ring to purchase vast quantities of silver for his clients. Id. In fact, his trips
were so frequent and the sums bought were so large that he "earned the reputa-
tion for being able to spur the price of silver simply by appearing in the ring." Id.
14. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88. Among Waltuch's more notable clients were the
billionaire Hunt brothers. Audrey Duff, Big Suits, Am. LAw., June 1989, at 23. La-
mar Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt, collectively known as
the Hunt brothers bought huge quantities of silver and silver futures. See id. at 23-
24 (discussing Hunt litigation). In less than seven months, the Hunt brothers
bought more than 100 million ounces of silver, an amount equal to one-half the
world production of silver in 1979. See Laurie Cohen, Hunts Charged in Silver Scheme
5-Year Probe Says Group Manipulated Market, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1985, at C1 (discuss-
ing Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) investigation of Hunt broth-
ers); Michael A. Hiltzik, Hunt Brothers Accused of Manipulating Silver Futures in '79
and '80, LA. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1985, § 4, at 1 (discussing CFTC investigation of Hunt
brothers); see alsoJerry Knight & James Rowe, Jr., Hunt Brothers' Thrill Ride in Silver
Takes U.S. Close to Disaster, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1980, at GI (discussing CFTC inves-
tigation of Hunt brothers); Roy Rowan, A Talkfest with the Hunts, FORTUNE, Aug. 11,
1980, at 162 (interviewing Hunt brothers about their actions and silver market
crash).
15. See Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88 (noting that "in late 1979 and early 1980 the
silver price spiked upward"). The price of silver increased five-fold in the period
between late 1979 and early 1980, going from $11 per ounce to a record high of
$50 per ounce. Cohen, supra note 14, at 1; Hi Ho, Silver Away: International Metals
Investment Co. Settles Commodities Futures Trading Commission Case, INFO. AccEss Co.,
June 1991, at 54 [hereinafter, Hi Ho, Silver Away].
16. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88. After peaking at $50 per ounce, the price dropped
back to $11 per ounce. Hi Ho, Silver Away, supra note 15, at 54. Prices then
plunged further to $5 per ounce in March 1980. Cohen, supra note 14, at 1. The
Hunt brothers inability to meet a $100 million margin call on silver future posi-
tions partly caused this catastrophe. Id.; see also Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 693 F.
Supp. 58, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing rise and fall of silver prices associated
with "Silver Thursday").
17. Arenson, supra note 13, at 2. Conticommodity ("Conti") lost $20 million
and the Hunt brothers incurred well over $1 billion in debts. Id. According to one
observer, the collapse did benefit at least one group: the lawyers who would repre-
sent the parties in the ensuing lawsuits. See Steven P. Garmisa, Silver Trader Escapes
Mother Lode of Legal Fees, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 4, 1996, at 5 (labeling Waltuch
"[the] silver trader who became a golden client for law firms-racking up legal
bills of $2.2 million after the 'Silver Thursday' collapse"). The market crash was
"bad for silver markets but great for legal futures, generating a large number of
lawsuits against Waltuch and Conticommodity." Id. Ironically, Waltuch, who had
been invested in the silver market, not only avoided harm by the crash, but
emerged from the crash with profits in excess of $10 million. Roy Rowan, Who
Guards Whom at the Commodity Exchange?, FORTUNE, July 28, 1980, at 38.
[Vol. 42: p. 223
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ulation and antitrust violations.18 Conti paid over $35 million in settle-
ment of the civil suits, all of which were dismissed with prejudice as to both
Conti and Waltuch. 19 Waltuch assumed no liability to the civil plaintiffs
and made no monetary contribution toward the settlement. 20 Waltuch
did not escape from the event unscathed, however, he incurred $1.2 mil-
lion in unreimbursed legal fees in defending against the civil suits.2 1
In addition to the private civil suits, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) brought an enforcement proceeding against Wal-
tuch, alleging fraud and market manipulation.2 2 Waltuch eventually set-
tled with the CFTC by agreeing to a six-month ban on buying or selling
futures contracts from any exchange floor and paying a $100,000 fine.23
In addition to the fine, Waltuch incurred substantial expenses in defend-
ing against the enforcement proceeding totaling $1 million in attorney
fees and CoStS. 2 4
Following settlement of the private and CFTC actions, Waltuch filed
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against Conti claiming indemnification for the legal expenses
he incurred defending both the civil suits and the CFTC enforcement pro-
ceeding.25 Waltuch's action set forth two claims for indemnification. 26
First, Waltuch claimed that "Article Ninth" of Conti's certificate of incor-
poration required Conti to indemnify him for the expenses incurred in
both the civil and CFTC actions. 27 Article Ninth afforded indemnification
18. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88. See, e.g., Minpeco, SA. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (alleging "fraud and violations of Commodities Exchange Act, fed-
eral anti-trust statutes, and federal racketeering statute"); Minpeco, SA. v. Con-
ticommodity Servs., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (suing for conspiracy to
manipulate market prices); Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (suing for conspiracy to manipulate silver prices and monopolize
silver industry in violation of various federal and state antitrust laws).
19. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88; see Duff, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing settlements
in class action suits filed by investors after silver market crash),
20. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88.
21. Id.
22. Id. For a discussion of the various CFTC proceedings brought in the wake
of "Silver Thursday," see Cohen, supra note 14, at 1; Hiltzik, supra note 14, at 1.
23. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88; see also CFTC Settles with Figure in Hunt Case, CHI.
TRIB.,July 12, 1990, at C5 ("Without admitting or denying the allegations, Waltuch
agreed to pay a civil penalty of $100,000 and agreed to cease and desist from violat-
ing the anti-fraud provisions of the commodities laws.").
24. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88 & n.1.
25. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 302, 304-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part by 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
26. Id. at 304. The district court disposed of both claims on summary judg-
ment. Id.
27. Id. at 306. "Article Ninth" of Conticommodity's certificate of incorpora-
tion specifically addressed the issue of indemnification, providing:
The Corporation shall indemnify and hold harmless each of its incum-
bent or former directors, officers, employees and agents ... against ex-
penses actually and necessarily incurred by him in connection with the
defense of any action, suit or proceeding threatened, pending or com-
5
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to Conti's directors and officers for expenses incurred in the defense of
any legal action so long as the individual claiming indemnification had
not been found liable for negligence or misconduct in that action.28 Wal-
tuch argued that he had clearly not been "adjudged liable for negligence
or misconduct" and as such was entitled to indemnity under Article
Ninth. 29 Moreover, Waltuch argued that he was entitled to indemnifica-
tion under Article Ninth even in the absence of good faith pursuant to
§ 145(f) of the Delaware Code.30
Conti countered by arguing that, in addition to satisfying Article
Ninth's internal standard of conduct, Waltuch was required to prove that
he had acted in "good faith" pursuant to § 145(a) of the Delaware Code. 31
The District Court agreed and denied Waltuch's motion for summary
judgment on his claim for indemnification under Article Ninth.3 2
pleted, in which he is made a party, by reason of his serving in or having
held such position or capacity, except in relation to matters as to which
he shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty.
Id.
28. Id. The district court agreed that "Article Ninth... [was] facially satisfied
since Waltuch has not been 'adjudged . . . liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of duty."' Id. (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the court denied
Waltuch's claim because it found Article Ninth to exceed the scope of Conti's
power to indemnify as granted by § 145 of the Delaware Code. Id. at 309. For a
discussion of the district court's decision, see supra notes 25-27, infra notes 29-40
and accompanying text.
29. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 306 (noting "that [Waltuch] has satisfied the lit-
eral terms of Article Ninth and argues that this should 'end the matter"').
30. Id. at 306-07. Waltuch claimed that § 145(f), the nonexclusivity provision
of the statue, allows a corporation to provide indemnification rights in addition to
those contained in the statute. Id. For a discussion of § 145(f), see infra notes 96-
112 and accompanying text. For a discussion and critical analysis of the Second
Circuit's construction of subsection (f), see infra notes 136-62, and 180-97 and ac-
companying text.
31. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 306-07. Section 145(a) grants corporations the
power to indemnify directors, officer and others provided that the person seeking
indemnification "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(a) (1994). For a further discussion of § 145(a), see infra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text. Conti contended that Waltuch was unable to meet this bur-
den and was therefore not entitled to indemnification under the statute. Waltuch,
833 F. Supp. at 306. Waltuch countered that Article Ninth was an example of the
additional rights to indemnification that a corporation could provide under
§ 145(f), and because it contained no good faith requirement he was entitled to
indemnification even in the absence of good faith on his part. Id. at 306-07.
-Neither the district court nor the Second Circuit fully considered whether Waltuch
had acted in good faith. SeeWaltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 89
(2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that on appeal issue before court was "how to interpret
... 145(a) and 145(f) assuming Waltuch acted with less than 'good faith"').
32. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 306-09. As a procedural note, Waltuch eventually
agreed to forgo trial on the issue of his good faith. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89. A final
judgment was entered against him on his claim based upon Article Ninth, and the
district court certified the issues for appeal. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs.,
Inc., No. 92 Civ. 0383, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1392, at *1-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1994).
[Vol. 42: p. 223
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In the alternative, Waltuch claimed that even if he was not to be in-
demnified under Article Ninth, he was entitled to indemnification as a
matter of right under § 145(c) of the Delaware Code because he was "suc-
cessful on the merits or otherwise" in defending the civil suits. 33 Waltuch
made this argument because the civil actions against him had been dis-
missed with prejudice without his assuming any liability.3 4
Conti, on the other hand, reasoned that the payments it made in set-
tlement were directly attributable to Waltuch's conduct and that, as a re-
sult, its payments were made on Waltuch's behalf.3 5 Consequently,
Waltuch's dismissals with prejudice were not truly achieved without pay-
ment and could not be considered "successful" under the statute.
36
Again, the district court agreed with Conti and granted its motion for sum-
maryjudgment with respect to Waltuch's claim for indemnification under
§ 145(c). 3 7
Waltuch appealed the district court's decision regarding his indemni-
fication claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit.3 8 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
Waltuch could not receive indemnification under Article Ninth of Conti's
certificate of incorporation in the absence of good faith.3 9 The court of
appeals, however, reversed the district court's decision to deny Waltuch's
claim for mandatory indemnification under § 145(c). 40
33. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (providing for
mandatory indemnification of expenses incurred when individual has been "suc-
cessful on the merits or otherwise" in defending action). For a further discussion
of mandatory indemnification under § 145(c), see infra notes 113-38 and accompa-
nying text.
34. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 310.
35. Id. at 309-10.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 309-12. The court granted Conti's motion for summary judgment,
denying Waltuch's claims under § 145(c) as to all of the civil plaintiffs with the
exception of one. Id. at 311. The court granted Waltuch's claim for the indemnifi-
cation of expenses incurred in connection with the Michelson suit because he had
been successful on the merits or otherwise in asserting a technical defense of insuf-
ficient service of process. Id. at 310-11. With respect to the other claims, the dis-
trict court agreed with Conti that Waltuch had not been truly "successful" in
defending the remaining private suits because he was only dismissed from the case
as a result of Conti making payments on his behalf in settlement. Id. at 311. Spe-
cifically, the court stated: "Being bailed out is not the same as being vindicated."
Id. The court later certified the issue for appeal. Waltuch, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1392, at *1-6.
38. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 87.
39. Id. at 89. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis of the issue on
appeal, see infra notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
40. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89. The district court denied indemnification under
§ 145(c) for Waltuch's legal expenses in both the private civil actions and the
CFTC proceeding. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 311. Waltuch appealed the ruling only
with respect to the expenses incurred in the civil actions. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89
n.4. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis of § 145(c), see infra notes
163-79 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second Circuit's con-
struction of § 145(c), see infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
1997] NOTE 229
7
Mayr: Indemnification of Directors and Officers: The Double Whammy of M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
230 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 223
III. BACKGROUND-CORPORATE POWER TO INDEMNIFY
A. The Liability Problem Confronting Corporations
Corporate directors and officers have become increasingly concerned
with the personal liabilities that may occasion their offices.4 1 Individuals
considering whether to become a director or officer are bitterly aware of
the large judgments rendered against corporate directors and officers in
recent years. 42 In addition to the substantial judgment and settlement
amounts, directors and officers also face the specter of the enormous at-
torney fees associated with defending against these claims.43 In fact, one
court has even gone so far as to state that "[1]itigation is an occupational
hazard for corporate directors." 44
The problem of director and officer liability has become exacerbated
in recent years because there has been a dramatic increase in the potential
threats of personal liability accompanied by an erosion of the traditional
protection against such threats.45 On one side of the problem, there has
been a significant increase in the volume of lawsuits launched against cor-
porate directors and officers seeking to impose personal liability upon
them.46 State and federal governments have added fuel to the fire by en-
41. For a general discussion of director and officer personal liability, see au-
thorities cited supra note 2.
42. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 515 (2d Cir. 1981) (af-
firming judgment finding directors jointly and severally liable for $53 million in
damages); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (resulting in $23 mil-
lion settlement in suit against directors); see also Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 943-
44 (noting "the potential for enormous money judgments and settlements in de-
rivative and stockholder class action suits" as cause of director and officer liability
crisis); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 400-01 (noting that "every director of a public
company is painfully aware of the celebrated damages case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,
where directors were found personally liable in damages for gross negligence in
hastily approving a merger transaction").
43. See CHEw, supra note 2, at 230 (noting that "[m]ountng a defense can cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars," and that during late eighties, "the average de-
fense costs of a major litigation were $476,000" (citation omitted)). Waltuch in-
curred over $2.2 million in attorney fees in defending both the civil and CFIC
actions, illustrating the huge expense involved in director and officer defenses.
Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 88.
44. Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369, 369 (7th Cir.
1992). Despite this potential hazard, the court observed that litigation expenses
"may often be shifted to the corporation through indemnification." Id.; see also
SCHAE-TLR, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that "[t] he liabilities of office of a corporate
executive have increased substantially with the growth of business and the impor-
tant role played by the publicly held corporations in modern society"); Bishop, New
Problems, supra note 2, at 1153 (noting that "the Damocles' sword of personal liabil-
ity is as much a part of the furniture of the executive suite as the Bigelow on the
floor").
45. For a discussion of the increase in the personal liability of directors and
officers, see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. For a disscusion of the ero-
sion of the traditional protections against director and officer personal liability, see
infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
46. See CHEw, supra note 2, at 2 (noting "[t]he increasing number and types of
lawsuits are sensitizing directors and officers to the personal risks inherent in their
8
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acting and promulgating new statutory and regulatory mandates.4 7 At the
same time, the principal protection against these new threats of liability,
director and officer liability insurance, has deteriorated in recent years. 48
Faced with the proliferation of potential liability, some individuals have
determined that the risks of office outweigh the benefits and have decided
not to serve as directors and officers.49 Consequently, in order to attract
and retain qualified individuals to serve as directors and officers, corpora-
tions have been forced to provide an efficient and comprehensive shield
against personal liability.50 Indemnification has proven to be an indispen-
sable component of this shield.
fiduciary roles"). The number of lawsuits filed against directors and officers is
increasing rapidly at an annual rate of between 15% and 20%. Id. Surveys of di-
rectors and officers in 1990 and 1991 revealed that 25% had been the object of a
lawsuit. Id.
47. SeeJohnston, supra note 5, at 1993-94 (noting modern expansion of state
and federal consumer-oriented statutes has created new causes of action which
have "added a new impetus to the remarkable litigiousness of American society").
48. See Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 943-44 (discussing erosion of liability
insurance coverage for directors and officers). Historically, director and officer
(D&O) liability was not a problem. Beginning in 1984, however, the director and
officer liability environment became very different. Id. At that time, concern for
director and officer liability was sparked by "i) increased premiums ... for D&O
insurance[;] . . . ii) decreased availability of D&O insurance; . . . and iii)
proliferat[ion] of exclusions to D&O . . . policies." Id. In 1986 alone, insurance
premiums for directors and officers increased by 500% and deductibles doubled.
CHEW, supra note 2, at 242. For a general discussion of directors' and officers'
insurance, see BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, § 8, at 8-1 to
8-47; CHEW, supra note 2, at 242-62; KNEPPER & BAI.EY, supra note 2, at 335-488;
Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 584-619; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 961-
97; Karen Leigh Chapman, Note, Statutory Responses to Boardroom Fears, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 749, 752-56.
49. See SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 2 (noting "the growing reluctance of com-
petent people to join the board"); Pease, supra note 2, at 167 (noting that nomi-
nees for directorships are concerned about growing number of cases imposing
liability upon directors for negligence); Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 945 ("Quali-
fied persons . . . [are] reluctant to serve as directors if they perceive[ ] that the
insurance and indemnification available to them . . . [are] inadequate because of
the possible ... risks involved in such service."); Laura Baum &John A. Byrne, The
Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 (noting that only two out of five
individuals offered executive positions at major corporation accepted as opposed
to four out of five who accepted five years earlier); Tamar Lewin, Directors Insurance
Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1986, at DI (noting that directors of five major
corporations all resigned when their insurance policies ended).
50. DennisJ. Block et al., Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate Officials, 13
SEC. REG. L.J. 239, 239 (1985). Discussing the director and officer liability crisis,
the authors state:
To get the best individuals to fill the slots of officers and directors, it
often is not enough to offer attractive remuneration. It is also necessary
to provide for a shield against the threat of lawsuits through the promise
of indemnification and directors and officers liability insurance.
Id.; see also Pease, supra note 2, at 167-68 (noting "one of the first questions asked
by a new nominee to a board of directors is whether the company has an indemni-
fication provision in its bylaws" because nominees are concerned about increase in
director liability); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 400 ("In view of the substantial
1997] NOTE
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B. The Development of Indemnification Protection
A corporation's power to indemnify officers and directors for legal
expenses was not firmly established at common law.5 1 Many courts held
that a corporation did not have the power to indemnify their directors and
officers for expenses incurred in defending lawsuits. 52 In the mid-twenti-
eth century, however, some courts began to recognize the need for corpo-
rate indemnification. 53 More importantly, the uncertainty at common law
prompted many corporations and their executives to petition their legisla-
tures to enact explicit statutory authorization for indemnification. 54 State
judgments rendered against directors by the courts in recent years ... directors are
demanding increased protection from personal liability.").
51. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 231 (noting that "the common law on indemni-
fication was.., confusing and unpredictable"); Arsht, supra note 5, at 176 (noting
"there had been divergent holdings by the courts in New York and New Jersey on
the question of whether the common law provided a right of indemnification");
Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty to Always Obey the Law ?
45 DEPAUL L. REv. 729, 748 (1996) (noting existence of "questions present at cor-
porate common law about the corporation's authority to indemnify"); Monteleone
& Conca, supra note 5, at 574 ("In years past, corporate employers were not permit-
ted to protect their corporate officials in the form of indemnification.").
For a general discussion of the common law on corporate indemnification,
see BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, § 6.01, at 6-3 to 6-4;
KNEPPER & BmLY, supra note 2, at 281-83; Klink et al., supra note 5, at 109-11.
52. See, e.g., New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(holding there was no common law basis allowing corporations to indemnify cor-
porate directors that successfully defend derivative suits); Griesse v. Lang, 175 N.E.
222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931) (holding corporations have no power to indemnify of-
ficers who successfully defend against shareholder actions); see also Klink et al.,
supra note 5, at 109 (noting that many cases and commentators have stated that "at
common law there was no right of indemnification"); Monteleone & Conca, supra
note 5, at 574 (noting that historically corporations could not protect officials
through indemnification). Most courts reasoned that corporations should be pre-
cluded from indemnifying their directors and officers because such payments were
not viewed as benefitting the corporation or the shareholders. Id. at 573. Further-
more, these courts found it difficult to uphold indemnification because many suits
against directors and officers did not fit neatly into traditional common law princi-
ples of agency. Johnston, supra note 5, at 1994-95.
53. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of E.C. Warner Co., 45 N.W.2d 388, 391-93
(Minn. 1950) (upholding corporation's power to indemnify); Solimine v. Hol-
lander, 19 A.2d 344, 348 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (upholding corporation's power to in-
demnify); see also Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 573-74 (noting "[in] the
1940s and 1950s... courts began to realize that a key ingredient to effective corpo-
rate management was the protection of corporate officials from personal liabil-
ity"). Some courts allowed for indemnification even earlier but only under certain
circumstances. For example, some courts would only uphold indemnification if
the director or officer had been successful in defending a suit. See, e.g., Wicker-
sham v. Crittenden, 39 P. 603 (Cal. 1895); Hollander v. Breeze Corp., 26 A.2d 507
(N.J. Ch. 1942). Still other courts would only allow for indemnification if the di-
rector or officer could prove that the underlying litigation had been beneficial to
the corporation. See, e.g., Jesse v. Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co., 189 N.W. 276 (Wis.
1922).
54. See BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, § 6.02, at 6-4 to
6-5 (noting that McCollom decision disturbed business community leading to re-
form of indemnification laws); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 573-74
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/5
1997] NoTE 233
legislatures responded positively by enacting enabling legislation convey-
ing broad indemnification powers upon corporations.55
Consistent with this trend, Delaware enacted § 145 of the Delaware
Code to provide Delaware corporations with generous indemnification
powers.56 Courts have liberally construed this section giving it an expan-
sive application. 57 Section 145 is intended to promote two significant pol-
icy objectives. 58 First, § 145 is intended to encourage capable individuals
to serve as corporate directors and officers by allaying their concerns over
potential personal liability through the vehicle of indemnification. 59 Sec-
("[C]orporate officials vigorously began to pursue the protection of corporate in-
demnification and corporations responded by seeking the power [from legisla-
tures] to indemnify their directors and officers.").
55. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 231 ("[B]ecause the common law on indemnifi-
cation was so confusing and unpredictable, states have adopted statutes specifying
when the corporation may indemnify its officers and directors."); Bishop, Sitting
Ducks, supra note 2, at 1078-79 (noting concern of personal liability held by corpo-
rate directors and officers "stimulated... the legislatures of most states of incorpo-
ration to devise ... statutes authorizing indemnification of corporate executives
under certain circumstances"); Johnston, supra note 5, at 1995 (noting that after
McCollom "[t]he legislatures in the business-oriented states quickly responded by
adopting statutes authorizing corporations to indemnify directors and officers");
Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 573-74 (noting that not long after corpora-
tions sought empowering legislation, "legislatures began to enact statutory
schemes permitting corporate indemnification").
It appears that the first indemnification statute was the British Clauses and
Consolidation Act of 1845. Klink et al., supra note 5, at 110. The Act provided that
a director carrying out an activity within his powers with the corporation is entitled
to indemnification from the corporation for any liability incurred in executing his
powers. Id. In modern times, all 50 states have enacted statutes authorizing corpo-
rations to indemnify their directors and officers. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2,
at 283. For examples of state indemnification statutes, see authorities cited
supra note 4. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act also contains a provi-
sion conveying broad indemnification powers upon corporations. REV. MODEL
Bus. CoR'. ACT §§ 8.50-.59 (1994).
56. See WELCH & TuRmzYN, supra note 5, § 145.1, at 245 ("Section 145 ad-
dresses the power of a Delaware corporation to indemnify its directors [and] of-
ficers... [it] confers broad, flexible indemnification powers."); Veasey et al., supra
note 2, at 404 ("Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law is the statu-
tory authority for indemnification."). For a thorough analysis of § 145, see
BALoTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 4.12-.18, at 180-200.6; WELCH & TuREZYN,
supra note 5, § 145.1-.7, at 245-52; Arsht, supra note 5, at 176-81; S. Samuel Arsht &
Walter K. Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23
Bus. LAw. 75, 77-80 (1967); Klink et al., supra note 5, at 109-30; Pease, supra note 2,
at 167-75; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 948-61.
57. See Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Both the language and the purpose of Delaware's indemnification statute
support interpreting its scope expansively.").
58. See Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 404 ("The two-fold policy of section 145
is: (i) to encourage corporate officials to resist what they consider unjustified suits
and claims 'secure in the knowledge that their reasonable expenses will be borne
by the corporation they have served if they are vindicated,' and (ii) to encourage
capable persons to serve as corporate directors." (citation omitted)).
59. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, 204 F.2d 888, 898 (3d Cir. 1953)
(construing § 145's predecessor and stating "[i]t seems clear that the purpose of
11
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ond, § 145 is intended to encourage directors and officers to actively resist
unjustified suits with the assurance that the corporation will pay for the
expenses associated with such defense.
60
C. The Statutory Framework of Indemnification Under § 145 of the
Delaware Code
Indemnification under § 145 is divided into two categories. 6 1 The
first category is permissive indemnification, which finds its statutory basis
statutes such as Delaware's is to encourage capable men to serve as corporate di-
rectors"); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974) (noting larger purpose of § 145 is "to encourage capable men to
serve as corporate directors"); see also WELCH & TuREzYN, supra note 5, § 145.2, at
246 (stating that § 145's "larger purpose" is to encourage capable persons to serve
as corporate directors and officers); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 574
(noting that indemnification statutes "were intended to encourage capable indi-
viduals to serve as directors and officers"). Those courts upholding the validity of
indemnification at common law also recognized this public policy objective. See In
re Dissolution of E.C. Warner Co., 45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (Minn. 1950) (holding in-
demnification is "a sound policy favorable to the development of sound corporate
management as a prerequisite for responsible corporate action"); Solimine v. Hol-
lander, 19 A.2d 344, 348 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (stating indemnification should be al-
lowed to encourage "responsible business men to accept the post of directors").
Two commentators suggest that:
The overriding goal of [statutory provisions such as § 145] was to protect
directors and officers from personal liability resulting from business deci-
sions. The statutes were intended to encourage capable individuals to
serve as directors and officers secure in the knowledge that they would be
insulated from personal liability if corporate actions, taken in good faith,
were brought under attack by way of a legal proceeding.
Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 573-74. For a discussion of the threats of
personal liability to corporate directors and officers, see supra notes 41-50 and ac-
companying text.
60. See McLean v. International Harvester Co., 902 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Indemnification under the Delaware statute is provided to assure corpo-
rate officials that they will not be hampered by financial constraints in mounting a
full defense against unjustified suits."); Mooney, 204 F.2d at 898 (stating that indem-
nification statutes allow directors to resist claims "secure in the knowledge that
expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and integrity as directors
will be borne by the corporation they serve"); Essential Enters. Corp. v. Automatic
Steel Prods., 164 A.2d 437, 441-42 (Del. Ch. 1960) (interpreting policy behind
earlier Delaware indemnification statute as "promot[ing] the desirable end that
corporate officials will resist what they consider to be [unjustified claims] .. .se-
cure in the knowledge that their reasonable expenses will be borne by the corpora-
tion they have served if they are vindicated").
61. See Wolfson, 321 A.2d at 140 (noting that § 145 is divided into two catego-
ries: (i) "subsection (a) which permits indemnification" and (ii) "subsection (c)
which requires indemnification"); CHEW, supra note 2, at 231 ("The statutes typi-
cally distinguish between (1) indemnification that the corporation is required by
law to provide, called mandatory indemnification [and] (2) indemnification that
the corporation is authorized but not required to provide, called permissive in-
demnification."); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 (noting that § 145 "distin-
guish[es] between situations in which the corporation must indemnify its directors
and officers (i.e., mandatory indemnification) and those in which a corporation
may indemnify its officers and directors (i.e., permissive indemnification)"); Bever-
234 [Vol. 42: p. 223
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in § 145 (a) and (b).62 Permissive indemnification under subsections (a)
and (b) may, in some circumstances, be supplemented by § 145(f), which
is also known as the nonexclusivity clause.63 The second category is
mandatory indemnification, which is provided in § 145(c). 6 4
1. Permissive Indemnification
Generally, indemnification under § 145(a) and (b) is permissive in
nature. 65 These subsections clearly establish corporate authority to in-
demnify directors and officers and effectively remove all questions regard-
ing the existence of such authority at common law.6 6 While these
subsections convey the power to indemnify upon a corporation, they in no
idge, supra note 51, at 748 ("These state statutes generally divide indemnification
into two categories, permissive and mandatory."); Monteleone & Conca, supra note
5, at 574-75 (noting that "indemnification can be broadly categorized as
'mandatory' or 'permissive"').
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (1994) (granting corporations power
to indemnify as long as indemnitee has acted in good faith and in manner consis-
tent with corporation's best interests). For a further discussion of permissive in-
demnification under subsections (a) and (b), see infra notes 65-95 and
accompanying text.
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (declaring § 145 not exclusive of other
rights to indemnification possessed by individual). For a discussion of supplemen-
tal indemnification under § 145(f), see infra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Second Circuit's construction of subsection (f), see in-fta notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (requiring corporations to indemnify indi-
viduals who succeed in defending actions). For a further discussion of mandatory
indemnification under subsection (c), see infra notes 113-35 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's construction of subsection (c), see
infra notes 163-79 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second
Circuit's construction of subsection (c), see infra notes 190-97 and accompanying
text.
65. See Klink et al., supra note 5, at 115 (noting "the permissive nature" of
subsections (a) and (b) "with respect to third party as well as derivative actions").
For a general discussion of permissive indemnification, see CHEW, supra note 2, at
234.1-236; FERRAR ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.03; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at
295-99; Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 576-80; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at
948-57.
66. See Beveridge, supra note 51, at 748 ("Permissive indemnification autho-
rizes ... the corporation to indemnify the director against certain liability, thereby
removing questions present at common law about the corporation's authority to
indemnify."). For examples of other state statutes authorizing permissive indemni-
fication, see ARiz. REv. STAT. § 10-005(A) to (B) (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-
850(A) to (B) (Michie 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b)-(c) (West 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-771; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch.
607.0850(1)-(2) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-851 (1996); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
8.75(a)-(b) (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 (Michie 1996); IowA
CODE § 490.851 (1995); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(a)-(c) (Consol. 1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-8-51(a) (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1741-1742 (West 1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-510 (Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502
(1996); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02-1(B) (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-697 (Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.510 (West 1995); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-9(a) to (b) (1996).
13
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way require the exercise of that power.67 Rather, exercise of the power to
indemnify directors and officers is wholly discretionary, and a director or
officer is not entitled to indemnification unless the corporation provides
for such protection in its by-laws or certificate of incorporation. 68
Permissive indemnification under § 145 is further divided into two
categories: suits brought by third parties; and suits brought by or in the
right of the corporation. 69 Section 145(a) generally addresses the power
67. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 234.1 (noting that permissive indemnification
applies "where the corporation is authorized but not required to indemnify");
Pease, supra note 2, at 172 (" [Section 145 (a) and (b)] of the Delaware corporation
law onlypermits the corporation to, but does not require it, to make payments in
indemnification of a director or officer.").
68. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that subsections (a) and (b) are "permissive in the sense that a cor-
poration may exercise less than its full power to grant the indemnification rights
set out in these provisions"); Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467, 471 (Del.
Ch. 1982) (noting that under § 145(b), it is not "assured that the corporation will
necessarily choose to indemnify" its directors or officers); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra
note 2, at 285 ("Indemnification statutes merely permit indemnification ... [t]hey
do not confer any right to indemnification except when the statute or appropriate
corporate action calls for mandatory indemnification."); Veasey et al., supra note 2,
at 406 ("[Subsections (a) and (b) ] are permissive. Implementation of the author-
ity granted requires action by the corporation."). Most corporations do provide
indemnity protection for their directors and officers in their certificate of incorpo-
ration or by-laws. Pease, supra note 2, at 171. Subsections (a) and (b) also em-
power a corporation to provide similar indemnity to their employees and agents.
Id. The by-laws and certificates of incorporation of many corporations do not ex-
tend, however, the protection of indemnification to employees and agents. In-
stead, they restrict such protection to directors and officers. Id. This illustrates
that even though the statute includes "employees" and "agents," it is only an en-
abling act, and therefore, it provides indemnification only where the corporation
so chooses. Nonetheless, employees and agents are commonly entitled to indem-
nification through traditional agency principles. Id.; see also WELCH & TuRzN,
supra note 5, § 145.3, at 248 n.12 ("[I]ndemnification under subsections (a) and
(b) is never guaranteed [because] ... [i]t is the corporation's option, assuming it
is financially feasible, to choose whether or not to indemnify its directors, officers,
employees or agents."); Beveridge, supra note 51, at 748 ("Permissive indemnifica-
tion authorizes, but does not require, the corporation to indemnify the director
against certain liability, thereby removing questions present at corporate common
law about the corporation's authority to indemnify."); Monteleone & Conca, supra
note 5, at 574-75 (noting under permissive indemnification "corporations are af-
forded the power, but not necessarily the duty, to provide indemnification");
Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 952 (noting that § 145(a) has been interpreted to
allow for indemnification of expenses of individuals as plaintiffs as well but that
corporation can avoid having to pay such expenses by limiting its indemnification
provision in its certificate or by-laws).
69. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 235 (noting that "statutes treat permissive in-
demnification differently, depending on whether the plaintiff is a third party [or
the corporation]"); WELCH & TuREzYN, supra note 5, § 145.3, at 246-47 ("The stat-
ute distinguishes (1) suits by or in the right of the corporation and (2) any other
type of suits or proceedings (third party actions), and declares the standards appli-
cable to each category."); Beveridge, supra note 51, at 748 ("Typically, permissive
indemnification provisions are further divided into two categories: (1) suits
brought by or on the behalf of the corporation.., and (2) suits brought by third
parties, public or private."); Klink et al., supra note 5, at 111 (noting that Delaware
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/5
of a corporation to indemnify its directors, officers and others for ex-
penses incurred in connection with litigation or other proceeding initi-
ated by third parties.70 Section 145(b), on the other hand, deals
exclusively with corporate authority to indemnify directors, officers and
others for expenses incurred in actions brought by or in the right of the
corporation (i.e., derivative suits). 7 1 While both subsections are permis-
sive in nature, the scope of their indemnification coverage differs
significantly.72
"draw[s] a distinction between the indemnification in third party and derivative
actions"); Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 948 ("Section 145... distinguishes between
suits brought by a corporation itself and suits brought by stockholders in the right
of the corporation ... and other actions.").
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a). For a discussion of indemnification for
expenses incurred in third party actions under § 145(a), see infra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text.
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b). For a discussion of indemnification for
expenses incurred in suits brought by or on behalf of the corporation under
§ 145(b), see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
72. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 579 (noting significant differ-
ences in scope of indemnification between third party suits and those brought by
or on behalf of corporation). For a discussion of the scope of indemnification
under § 145(a) and (b), see infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
A number of states have adopted statutory schemes similar to Delaware.
These states set forth two independent permissive indemnification subsections,
one dealing with third party actions and another dealing with actions brought by
or on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., A~iz. REv. STAT. § 10-005(A) to (B)
(1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850(A) to (B) (Michie 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 317(b)-(c) (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0850(1)-(2) (1995); 805 ILL. COMp.
STAT. 5/8.75(a)-(b) (West 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a)-(c) (Consol. 1996);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1741-1742 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(a) to (b)
(1996). Other states have adopted a different statutory framework. These states
set forth a broad grant of power to indemnify directors and officers against ex-
penses or liability incurred and then carve out an exception to that power where
the director or officer has been found liable to the corporation. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-771 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-851 (1996); IOWA CODE
§ 490.851 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-51(a), (d) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-
510 (Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502 (1996); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. art. 2.02-1(B) (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697 (Michie 1996); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.510 (West 1995). The result under most of these statutes
is the same as that under the Delaware model: under both statutory schemes a
director may not be indemnified for damages or settlement expenses incurred in
the event he or she is adjudged liable to the corporation. Sparks et al., supra note
3, at 951-52. For a discussion of the consequences of being adjudged liable to the
corporation, see infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
In contrast, Indiana's statute does not distinguish between third party suits
and those brought by or on behalf of the corporation. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8
(Michie 1996). The Indiana statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) A corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a pro-
ceeding because the individual is or was a director against liability in-
curred in the proceeding if:
(1) The individual's conduct was in good faith; and
(2) The individual reasonably believed:
(A) In the case of conduct in the individual's official capacity with
the corporation, that the individual's conduct was in its best interests; and
1997] NOTE
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a. Third Party Actions
Section 145(a) conveys broad indemnification powers for actions
brought against a corporate director or officer by third parties. 73 Gener-
ally, this section applies to any action brought against a director or officer
so long as such action is not brought by or in the right of the corpora-
tion.7 4 The scope of § 145(a) covers all such actions regardless of whether
the litigant is a public or private person, or entity. 75 In addition, the sec-
tion does not restrict the indemnification to expenses for commenced liti-
(B) In all other cases, that the individual's conduct was at least not
opposed to its best interests ....
Id. The Indiana statute simply provides corporations with the power to indemnify
directors and officers irrespective of the character of the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the
same rules apply even if the director or officer is adjudged liable to the corpora-
tion. Id.
73. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 232 (noting that under § 145 "[d]irectors and
officers may receive indemnification in virtually any type of litigation or proceed-
ing"); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 579 (noting third party actions
"carr[y] relatively few limitations regarding the scope of indemnification that may
be afforded"). Section 145(a) provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a
party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or
completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administra-
tive or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the corpo-
ration) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee
or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corpora-
tion, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against ex-
penses (including attorneys' fees),judgments, fines and amounts paid in
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had
no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termina-
tion of any action, suit, or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement,
conviction or under a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not,
of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith
and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).
74. See Pease, supra note 2, at 168 ("A third party suit is one other than an
action brought by or in the right of the corporation."); Veasey et al., supra note 2,
at 404 (noting that § 145(a) "applies only to third party actions, not to actions
brought by or in the right of the corporation"). Section 145(b) deals specifically
with suits brought by or in the right of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(b). For a discussion of § 145(b), see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying
text.
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (authorizing indemnification of ex-
penses for "any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding,
whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative"); see also Monteleone &
Conca, supra note 5, at 578 (noting that statute "is broad enough to encompass
almost any legal proceeding, including those brought by private litigants or gov-
ernmental agencies"); Pease, supra note 2, at 169 (noting § 145(a) authorizes cor-
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gation; instead, it encompasses a broad range of legal proceedings
including threatened, pending and completed actions. 76 Further,
§ 145(a) indemnifies directors, officers and others for expenses incurred
in such actions both as plaintiffs and as defendants. 77 The scope of in-
demnifiable expenses under § 145(a) is extremely generous, authorizing
corporations to indemnify directors and officers against expenses in-
curred, including attorney fees, judgments, fines and amounts paid in set-
tlement. 78 This broad spectrum of expenses is limited only by a vague
reasonableness standard.79
porations to indemnify directors and officers for expenses incurred in defending
criminal actions).
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (granting power to indemnify for ex-
penses of "any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to
any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil,
criminal, administrative or investigative"); see also WELCH & TuREzYz, supra note 5,
§ 145.3, at 247 (noting that subsection (a) "applies to a broad variety of third party
proceedings, whether threatened, pending or completed"). While it is clear that
§ 145 covers expenses incurred in traditional legal proceedings such as lawsuits, it
is also broad enough to cover nontraditional proceedings as well. CHEW, supra
note 2, at 232. Thus, § 145 can be used to provide indemnification for expenses
incurred in alternative dispute resolution forums such as arbitration and media-
tion. Id.
77. See Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983) (holding
former corporate directors entitled to indemnification for expenses incurred in
connection with suits filed by them in unsuccessful bid for re-election); Montele-
one & Conca, supra note 5, at 579 ("[T] here is no requirement under the statute
that the action, suit or proceeding be brought against the director or officer." (em-
phasis added)). Typically, indemnification is sought by directors and officers
when they have been forced to defend themselves in a lawsuit or other legal pro-
ceeding. Id. Nonetheless, the statute speaks of the director being made a "party"
to a legal proceeding; not a "defendant." Id. Because both defendants and plain-
tiffs are "parties" to a legal proceeding, it follows that a director or officer who
brings an action, suit or proceeding as a plaintiff is a "party" to such proceeding
and thus may be entitled to indemnification. Id.; see also CHEW, supra note 2, at
232-33 (noting that corporations may indemnify directors and officers when they
act as parties suing as opposed to being sued because § 145 "indicates that the
corporation may indemnify a director or an officer who is a 'party' to a proceed-
ing"). In contrast, some states have expressly restricted the application of their
indemnification statutes exclusively to directors and officers who were defendants
in legal proceedings. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(B) (West Supp.
1996) (limiting indemnification of directors and officers to expenses incurred as
defendants).
78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a); see Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 404-05
("Section 145(a) permits indemnification of officers, directors, employees and
agents for attorneys' fees and other expenses as well asjudgments or amounts paid
in settlement of civil cases.").
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (providing indemnification "against
expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settle-
ment actually and reasonably incurred by [indemnitee] in connection with such
action"); see also Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 579 (noting that "indemnifi-
cation of a director or officer may be objectionable if the amounts indemnified are
unreasonably excessive"). The standards used to determine the reasonableness of
expenses incurred are similar to those typically used by courts in determining
NOTE
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While § 145 (a) gives corporations broad indemnification power, that
power is not unlimited.8 0 Section 145(a) contains two significant public
policy limitations upon the power to indemnify.8 1 First, the section explic-
itly sets forth a good faith requirement that must be satisfied.8 2 Second, in
whether to award fees. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138,
143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
Some states impose a stricter standard requiring that expenses be "actually
and necessarily" incurred. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (Consol. 1995).
The scope of indemnifiable expenses under such a statute would be narrower than
under a statute requiring only that expenses be reasonable. See KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 2, at 295 ("Anything necessary would presumably be reasonable, but an
expenditure might be reasonable although not necessary."); see also Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 580 F.2d 1222, 1227 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting
that by-law requirement that expenses be actually and necessarily incurred was
stricter requirement than Maryland statute requiring expenses be actually and rea-
sonably incurred).
80. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (allowing indemnification in third
party suits only if indemnitee acted in good faith and in manner reasonably be-
lieved consistent with best interests of corporation).
81. See id. (providing that corporations may indemnify directors, officers and
others provided that they "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation");
see also CHEW, supra note 2, at 235 ("Corporations are permitted to indemnify di-
rectors for their expenses and liability from a civil case brought by a third party if
they (1) acted in 'good faith' and (2) reasonably believed that their conduct was in
the corporation's best interests."). Section 145(a) includes a third policy limita-
tion applicable to expenses incurred in connection with a criminal proceeding.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a). In such a case, indemnification is available as long
as the individual "had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful."
Id. For a further discussion of indemnification for criminal actions, see Pamela H.
Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An
Assessment and Proposa4 24 IND. L. Rrv. 279 (1991).
82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (providing corporations with power to
indemnify individuals for expenses incurred in third party actions "if [the individu-
als] acted in good faith"); Pease, supra note 2, at 168 (noting that in third party
actions, indemnification is available "provided it is found that he acted in good
faith"); see also Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 78 (discussing good faith stan-
dard under § 145).
Most commentators agree that both the good faith and reasonable belief stan-
dards are premised upon the principle of a "duty of loyalty" and not the "duty of
care." See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 298 (noting commentators agree
good faith requirement is based on duty of loyalty concept, not duty of care);
Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 949-50 ("The legislative history of Section 145 indi-
cates that both the 'good faith' and 'reasonable belief' standards were premised
upon 'duty of loyalty' and not 'duty of care' concepts."). Indeed the principal
drafter of the 1967 revisions that added the good faith and best interests require-
ment has stated that the amendments were intended to prevent the statute from
undermining the duty of loyalty. Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 78. This
distinction is significant because it means that a director or officer who has been
found liable to the corporation for breach of the duty of care owed to the corpora-
tion may still be eligible for indemnification as long as the director or officer has
not breached his or her duty of loyalty. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 298.
For example, in the celebrated case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), the directors were adjudged liable for gross negligence, but there was no
evidence that they had not acted in good faith or violated their duty of loyalty. Id.
Consequently, they might still be eligible for indemnification if all other condi-
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addition to establishing good faith, indemnification requires that a direc-
tor or officer seeking indemnification demonstrate that he or she acted in
a manner reasonably believed to be consistent with the best interests of
the corporation. 83
b. Actions by or in the Right of the Corporation-Derivative Suits
Section 145(b) specifically addresses the power of a corporation to
indemnify its directors and officers for expenses incurred in connection
with an action brought "by or in the right of the corporation." 84 Typically,
these actions occur when a director or officer breaches one of the duties
tions were met. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 298; see also Sparks et al., supra
note 3, at 949-50 (noting that in Van Gorkom, indemnification would be permissible
because, the "Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that the 'grossly negligent' vio-
lation of the duty of care . . . did not involve lack of good faith on the part of the
directors and, arguably, therefore, no duty of loyalty violation of the type the 'good
faith' and 'reasonable belief' tests were meant to implicate").
The Official Comment to the Revised Model Business and Corporations Act
section expressly states that the good faith and reasonable belief requirements are
applicable to the duty of loyalty and not to the duty of care. See REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT § 8.51(a) cmt. 1 (1994) (stating that "section 8.51(a) authorizes indem-
nification at the corporation's option even though section 8.30's due care require-
ment is not met"); Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 950 (noting that under § 8.51 "a
director or officer who has not acted with the care an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, required by section
8.30, could nevertheless be indemnified if the standard of section 8.51 (the indem-
nification provision) were met").
83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (providing corporations may indem-
nify individuals if such individual acted "in a manner he reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation"); Pease, supra note 2, at
168-69 (noting that in third party actions indemnification is available "provided it
is found that he acted in . . . a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation"). Virtually every state indemnifi-
cation statute contains an identical code of conduct. For examples of such stat-
utes, see authorities cited supra note 66.
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b). Section 145(b) provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a
party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or
completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to procure
a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise
against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably in-
curred by him in connection with the defense or settlement of such ac-
tion or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation
and except that no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim,
issue or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be
liable to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the Court of
Chancery or the court in which such action or suit was brought shall de-
termine upon application, that, despite the adjudication of liability but in
view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reason-
ably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery
or such court shall deem proper.
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he or she owes to the corporation. 85 The corporation then maintains an
action against such director or officer for damages suffered by the corpo-
ration as a result of the breach.86 Actions brought by or in the right of the
corporation are either maintained directly by the corporation itself or, al-
ternatively, by a shareholder or shareholders in a "derivative suit" on be-
half of the corporation to recover losses suffered by the corporation. 87
The most significant difference between subections (b) and (a) is that
the scope of expenses that a corporation is authorized to indemnify is nar-
rower under subsection (b).88 While the scope of expenses under subsec-
tion (a) allows for indemnification of amounts paid in settlement or under
judgments, subsection (b) does not permit indemnification of such
amounts in actions brought by or in the right of the corporation. 89 Sub-
Id. For examples of similar statutory sections dealing exclusively with actions
brought by or in the right of the corporation, see Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 10-005(B)
(1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850(B) (Michie 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)
(West 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0850(2) (1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.75(b)
(West 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (Consol. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1742 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(b) (1996).
85. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 579-80 (explaining that an "ac-
tion by or in the right of the corporation" takes place "in the event a director or
officer breaches his or her duties to the corporation," and in such case, "the corpo-
ration may pursue a legal action to collect the losses incurred as a result of such
wrongful conduct").
86. See id. at 580 (noting that when director or officer violates duty owed "the
corporation assumes the capacity of plaintiff asserting claims against its director or
officer").
87. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 235 ("The corporation may be the plaintiff in a
suit against its directors or officers in two circumstances: (1) when the corporation
sues its directors or officers on its own behalf (direct corporate actions) and (2)
when shareholders sue the directors or officers on the corporation's behalf (deriv-
ative actions)."); see also MCI Telecomms. v. Wanzer, CA., Nos. 89C-MR-216, 89C-
SE-26, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 222, at *9-18 (Del. Super. Ct.June 19, 1990) (hold-
ing that actions "by or in the right of the corporation" under subsection (b) in-
clude direct actions brought by corporation); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5,
at 579-80 (noting that in event of breach of fiduciary duty, corporation may bring
action on its own directly against director or officer, or that "a shareholder may
assert the claim on behalf of (or 'in the right of) the corporation-a so-called
derivative action"). An action brought by a shareholder or shareholders on behalf
of the corporation is known as a derivative suit and is the most common type of
action falling under § 145(b). See Pease, supra note 2, at 168 (citing actions
brought by shareholders against directors for damages corporation had to pay for
violation of antitrust laws as example of derivative suit); Veasey et al., supra note 2,
at 405 (noting § 145(b) most frequently applies to derivative suits). For a discus-
sion of derivative suits and indemnification, see SCHAEFrLER, supra note 2, at 15-34.
88. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 235-36 (noting that "[i] ndemnification is more
restricted" in actions brought "by or in the right of the corporation" as opposed to
third party actions); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 579 (noting that
§ 145(b) "imposes certain limitations on the indemnification afforded in connec-
tion with" actions brought "by or in the right of the corporation" which are not
imposed upon third party actions under § 145(a)).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b). The policy behind the limitation
upon indemnifiable expenses in derivative actions is quite straightforward. See
Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 79-80 (discussing drafting committee's ration-
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section (b) restricts indemnification exclusively to attorney fees and other
expenses and does not permit indemnification for judgments or amounts
paid in settlement of an action.90 Thus, when a director or officer is ad-
ale behind excluding amounts paid in settlement and judgment under § 145(b)).
In a derivative action, the corporation is in fact the plaintiff, and the director or
officer is the defendant. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 580 ("Whether
the legal action is asserted directly by the corporation or derivatively by a share-
holder, the corporation assumes the capacity of plaintiff asserting claims against its
director or officer. Consequently, certain restrictions are placed on [the] direc-
tor's or officer's right to indemnification from the corporation."); Veasey et al.,
supra note 2, at 405-06 (noting that "in a derivative action the ultimate plaintiff is
the corporation on whose behalf the suit is brought"). Judgments and settlement
payments flow from the defendant director to the plaintiff corporation as compen-
sation for the losses caused by the director's misconduct. Veasey et al., supra note
2, at 405-06 ("[Alny resulting money judgments against, or settlement funds pro-
vided by, the defendant is paid to the corporation in order to make it whole."). If
the corporation was required to reimburse the defendant for judgments or
amounts paid in settlement, a circular and self-defeating process would result. See
CHEW, supra note 2, at 236 (noting it "would be meaningless if the corporation
received funds from them as damages and then turned around and returned the
funds to them as indemnification"); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 296 ("The
theory of this restriction is that it will avoid circularity: namely, for the corporation
to recover funds ... and then pay them over to the director who had paid them
would constitute a meaningless exercise."); SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 3 (noting
that if corporation is indemnified for judgments or settlements in derivative suits
"[t]he result is circuity of payments: the officer or director pays money into the
corporation, and the corporation turns right around and puts the money back into
the director's or officer's pocket"); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 580 (not-
ing that "[t]he theory is that the corporation would be indemnifying the director
or officer for a settlement ultimately paid to the corporation itself as plaintiff' and
that Delaware has "determined that such circularity of payment is unacceptable").
In effect, the corporation would never be made whole in a derivative suit because it
would always have to payback all amounts received in judgment or settlement to
the defendant through indemnification. See Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 952 (not-
ing that if indemnification of judgment or settlement expenses were permitted
"the efficiency of the derivative suit would be undermined"); Veasey et al., supra
note 2, at 405-06 ("The corporation would not receive [the benefit of compensa-
tion] if it were to reimburse a defendant for the amount of the judgment or settle-
ment funds that the defendant is required to pay the corporation.").
Some states, such as New York, tolerate circularity of payment but only with
court approval. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 & cmt. (a) (Michie 1996); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (Consol. 1996). These states allow indemnification of
amounts paid in settlement or in satisfaction of ajudgment if, upon application, a
court deems the defendant "fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity." N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 722(a). Furthermore, Indiana has rejected the circularity argument
and allows indemnification even where a director has been adjudged liable to the
corporation, as long as that individual meets the standard of conduct under the
statute. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 & cmt. (a) (noting that "the Commission con-
cluded that indemnification should not be prohibited so long as a person can in
fact meet [the section's] indemnification standards-notwithstanding formalistic
concerns about 'circularity'").
90. See WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249-50 (comparing subsec-
tions (a) and (b) and noting in contrast to subsection (a) "nothing is said about
indemnifying the amounts paid in settlement, although the corporation may in-
demnify 'against expenses' actually and reasonably incurred"); Sparks et al., supra
note 3, at 952 (noting that under subsection (b) "indemnification is limited to the
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judged liable to the corporation in suits brought by or in the right of the
corporation, any rights to indemnification are significantly curtailed. 9'
director's litigation expenses and does not include amounts paid in settlement or
in satisfaction of a judgment"); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 405 (noting § 145(b)
"permits indemnification only for attorneys' fees and other expenses" and "does
not permit indemnification of judgments or amounts paid in settlement").
The argument can be made that the term "expenses" used in § 145(b) is
broad enough to include amounts paid by the defendant to the corporation in
satisfaction of a judgment or settlement. Bishop, Sitting Ducks, supra note 2, at
1083-84. The better interpretation, however, is that such amounts are not in-
cluded in the scope of § 145(b). Id. This conclusion is warranted by the fact that
subsection (a) explicitly includes judgments and amounts paid in settlement
within its scope and subsection (b) omits them. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-
(b). The express inclusion in one section and the exclusion in the other demon-
strates a legislative intent to prohibit indemnification of such amounts in derivative
suits. Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 405-06. Commentators have illustrated this
argument, stating:
It can be argued that since section 145(b) does not expressly prohibit
indemnification ofjudgments or amounts paid in settlement in derivative
suits, such indemnification may be provided under the "non-exclusive"
provision of section 145(f). It would seem that since subsection (a) and
(b) should be read in pari materia, the express inclusion of the broader
indemnification power in (a) and its exclusion in (b) demonstrates a leg-
islative intent to prohibit indemnification ofjudgment or amount paid in
settlement of derivative suits.
Id.; see also Bishop, Sitting Ducks, supra note 2, at 1084 (noting that "the draftsmen
of [§ 145(b)] . . .unequivocally disclaim" any intention that "expenses" be con-
strued to include amounts paid to corporation in derivative suits).
Other states have determined to allow for recovery of amounts paid in settle-
ment or judgment in actions brought by or in the right of the corporation. See,
e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 10-005(B) (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850(B) (Michie
1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.75(b) (West 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(c);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1742 (West 1996). Typically, these statutes only allow
for such recovery when, upon application, the appropriate court determines in
view of all the circumstances that the director or officer is "fairly and reasonably
entitled to indemnity" for such amounts. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(c). Still
other states have taken a more liberal approach, permitting indemnification of
amounts paid in settlement or in satisfaction of ajudgment in derivative suits even
in the absence of court approval. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8. For exam-
ple, Indiana allows for indemnification in any action, whether by a third party or
derivative in nature, as long as the applicable standard of conduct is satisfied. Id.
Thus, in Indiana, a corporation has the power to indemnify its directors and of-
ficers for liabilities incurred, including judgments and settlements, in any suit as
long as "the individual's conduct was in good faith" and "the individual reasonably
believed" his or her conduct was in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation. Id. In contrast, other states have dramatically circumscribed a corpo-
ration's power to indemnify directors and officers who have been found liable to
the corporation. Some states have gone so far as to extinguish indemnification
powers completely when a director has been adjudged liable to the corporation.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-771(d) (1994); IOWA CODE § 490.851(4) (1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-51(d) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-510(d) (Law Co-op.
1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502(d) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697(D)
(Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.510(4) (West 1995).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (limiting availability of directors and
officers found liable to corporation). It is worth noting that a director or officer
may still be protected from the potential liability of actions brought by or in the
244
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In addition to narrowing the scope of expenses a corporation may
agree to indemnify in derivative suits, subsection (b) also restricts the cir-
cumstances in which such indemnification is available.92 Similar to sub-
section (a), indemnification under subsection (b) requires that a director
or officer seeking indemnification must have acted in good faith and in a
manner he or she reasonably believed to be consistent with the best inter-
ests of the corporation.93 Additionally, the subsection imposes a further
constraint in the event that a director or officer is found liable to the cor-
poration in a derivative suit.9 4 In such a case, subsection (b) prohibits
indemnification of any expenses unless, upon application, the appropriate
court determines that the defendant is fairly and reasonably entitled to
indemnity.95
right of the corporation because there are other liability limiting mechanisms
available in Delaware. See id. § 102(b) (7) (allowing corporations to limit director
liability to corporation for certain breaches of fiduciary duty); id. § 145(g) (grant-
ing corporations power to provide insurance to directors and officers); see
also Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 978-97 (discussing § 102(b) (7) as limitation upon
director liability for duty of care violations). Most importantly, a corporation has
the power to provide liability insurance to directors and officers. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (providing that corporations have power to provide insurance
for directors and officers to cover liabilities whether or not corporation could in-
demnify for such liabilities under § 145). While the insurance policies themselves
have limitations and exclusions, they could potentially cover amounts paid in the
form of judgments and settlements in a derivative action. See Sparks et al., supra
note 3, at 969 (noting that insurance policies can cover amounts paid in settlement
and judgments in derivative suits). For a general discussion of directors' and of-
ficers' insurance, see BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, § 8, at
8-1 to 8-47; CHEw, supra note 2, at 242-62; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 335-
488; Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 584-619; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at
961-97.
Furthermore, a Delaware corporation may include a provision in its certificate
of incorporation limiting, or even eliminating altogether, the liability of a director
or officer to the corporation for some breaches of fiduciary duty. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (authorizing corporations to limit or eliminate personal
liability of director to corporation for breaches of fiduciary duty). For a discussion
of § 102(b) (7), see R. Franklin Balotti & MarkJ. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar:
Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 5 (1987); Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers'
Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439 (1988); Sparks
et al., supra note 3, at 978-97; Thomas C. Lee, Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors'
Liability: Delaware's Section 102(B)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors'Duty of Care, 136
U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1987).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b).
93. Id.; see WELCH & TuRtzYN, supra note 5, § 145.3, at 248 ("Indemnification
under subsection (b), like subsection (a), is dependent on the individual's having
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation.").
94. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 297 (noting in addition to good faith
and "best interests," "[t] here is an additional requirement when a person has been
adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to
the corporation").
95. Id. The relevant part of § 145(b) provides:
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c. Supplemental Indemnification and the Nonexclusivity Provision
In addition to defining the types of cases that fall under the umbrella
of permissive and mandatory indemnification, § 145 also recognizes that
supplemental rights to indemnification may be created by declaring the
section nonexclusive. 9 6 Subsection (f) states that § 145 "shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other right to which those seeking indemnifica-
[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or mat-
ter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to the
corporation unless and only to the extent that the Court of Chancery or
the court in which such action or suit was brought shall determine upon
application, that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the
circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to
indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other
court shall deem proper.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b); see WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 5, § 145.3, at 248
("[W] here a person has been adjudged liable to the corporation ... there must be
a finding by the ... court that the person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indem-
nification."); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 405 (noting that § 145(b) "does not
permit any indemnification" if individual is found liable, except upon application
to court). It should be noted that while this provision is of significance, it will
likely only be applied to a relatively narrow set of cases. SeeJohnston, supra note 5,
at 1997 (discussing § 145(b)'s allowance for expenses upon court approval). This
is primarily because it is hard to imagine many cases in which a court will find both
that a director or officer has violated a fiduciary duty to the corporation and is
concurrently "fairly and reasonably" entitled to reimbursement for expenses in-
curred. Id. The most probable situation would be in a case where the court has
imposed liability on the corporation according to a new and higher standard
which the director or officer could not have reasonably anticipated. Id.
Some statutes prohibit any indemnification in the event that a director or
officer is found liable to the corporation in a suit brought by or in the right of the
corporation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-771(d) ("A corporation may not in-
demnify a director under this section: (1) In connection with a proceeding by or
in the right of the corporation in which the director was adjudged liable to the
corporation .... ); IOWA CODE § 490.851(4) (a) ("A corporation shall not indem-
nify a director under this section ... [i]n connection with a proceeding by or in
the right of the corporation in which the director [is] adjudged liable to the corpo-
ration."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-51(d)(1) ("A corporation may not indemnify a
director under this section: (1) In connection with a proceeding by or in the right
of the corporation in which the director was adjudged liable to the corpora-
tion .... ); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-510(d)(1) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-
502(d) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697(D) (same); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 23B.08.510(4) (same). In such a state, a director or officer found liable to
the corporation may not even recover the costs of attorney fees and other
expenses.
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f). Subsection (f) provides:
The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by, or
granted pursuant to, the other subsections of this section shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnifica-
tion or advancement of expenses may be entitled under any by-law, agree-
ment, vote of stockholder or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as
to action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while
holding such office.
Id. For a discussion of nonexclusivity provisions in indemnification statutes, see
BALOTri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.16, at 196-200.1; BISHOP, INDEMNIFICA-
TION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, §§ 6.11-.12, at 6-20 to 6-27; CHEW, supra note 2,
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tion ... may be entitled under any by-law, agreement or vote of stockhold-
ers or disinterested directors or otherwise." 9 7 On its face, this provision
appears to expand the permissive authority to indemnify found in subsec-
tions (a) and (b), conveying upon corporations expansive powers of in-
demnification. 98 Indeed, the case law interpreting subsection (f) has
been generous in its construction of the nonexclusivity provision.99
at 238-42; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 304-12; Johnston, supra note 5, at
2009-11; Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 582-84.
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f). Forty-four states have nonexclusivity pro-
visions in their indemnification statutes. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 304.
For examples of nonexclusivity provisions in other state statutes, see Amz. Rrv.
STAT. § 10-005(F) (1995); Aiu. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850(F) (Michie 1995); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 317(g) (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0850(7) (1995); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8.75(f) (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-15 (Michie 1996);
IOWA CODE § 490.858; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (Consol. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-8-57; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1746 (West 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-
509(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(f) (1996); see also Bev-
eridge, supra note 51, at 748 ("[M]ost statutes provide that the statutory provisions
are nonexclusive of other rights which the director may have to indemnification by
contract or otherwise.").
In contrast, the old Model Business Corporation Act was exclusive because it
required that any agreement to indemnify in a corporation's articles, in the by-laws
or by contract is "valid only if and to the extent the provision is consistent" with the
other provisions of the indemnification statute. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.58(a)
(1967); see Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, 36 Bus. LAw. 99, 115
(1980) (discussing modifications to Model Business Act and noting that it specifi-
cally changed to require that "every provision for indemnification of directors by
corporations must be consistent with the statute in order to be valid" as opposed to
merely declaring statute nonexclusive). One commentator has summarized the
effect of an exclusive statute as follows:
This presumably means that the statutes define the minimum and maxi-
mum limits for indemnification. At a minimum, corporations must pro-
vide directors and officers indemnification provided for under the
mandatory indemnification statutes. At the other extreme, corporate
indemnification may not exceed that provided for under permissive in-
demnification and court-ordered indemnification. In other words, in-
demnification provided for under the statues is exclusive.
CHEw, supra note 2, at 238; see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.07 ("Under
the Model Business Corporation Act provision, it is relatively clear that no substan-
tive protection can be afforded by the corporation in excess of what is specifically
permitted by the relevant indemnification statute."). For examples of states with
similar consistency provisions in their indemnification statutes, see CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33-772; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-580(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-509(3);
TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02-1(M) (West 1996); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 23B.08.590(1).
98. See CHEW, supra note 2, at 239 (noting that nonexclusive provisions are
unclear, but that current "trend appears to be to interpret them to maximize cor-
porate discretion"); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 415 ("[S]ection 145(f) does pro-
vide support for wide-ranging agreements or by-laws that broaden indemnification
rights granted in other subsections of 145 .... "). For a discussion of cases inter-
preting § 145(f) as expanding a corporation's permissive indemnification power,
see infra note 104.
99. See, e.g., Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 896 (3d
Cir. 1953) (upholding corporation's power to provide independent ground for
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Notwithstanding the trend toward a broad interpretation, the power
to indemnify under subsection (f) is not unlimited.10 0 Most commenta-
tors generally agree that subsection (f) was not meant as a plenary grant of
authority to indemnify and is clearly limited by public policy con-
indemnification pursuant to statutory predecessor of § 145(f)); PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (construing § 145(f)
to give corporations broad power to indemnify and characterizing other provisions
of statute as mere "fall back" provisions); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d
339, 344 (Del. 1983) (discussing § 145(f) and stating that it gives corporations
power to "grant indemnification rights beyond those provided by the statute");
Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 562, 565 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986) (characterizing § 145(f) as "the 'nonexclusion' provision which says that
there may be an agreement to indemnify for legal expenses which is not founded
in, or limited by, the other provisions of the statute"); see also B & B Inv. Club v.
Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (construing Pennsylvania
nonexclusivity clause to allow corporations to provide rights not expressly in stat-
ute). Both the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and the Second Circuit recognized the expansive effect of subsection (f), but they
also felt there were limitations upon that power. For a discussion of limitations
upon § 145(f)'s broad power as identified by these two courts, see infra notes 139-
62 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second Circuit's construc-
tion of subsection (f), see infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
100. See Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 975 ("[Plublic policy limits the power to
indemnify under Section 145(f)."). Samuel S. Arsht was the chairman of the com-
mittee that drafted Delaware's General Corporation Law in 1967. Arsht, supra
note 5, at 176 n.*. In a 1978 article, Arsht noted that the nonexclusivity of
§ 145(c) was unquestionably limited by public policy, stating:
The question which subsection (f) invariably raises is whether a corpora-
tion can adopt a by-law or make a contract with its directors providing
that they will be indemnified for whatever they may have to pay if they are
sued and lose or settle. The answer to this question is "no." . . . The
statutory language is circumscribed by limits of public policy ....
Id. at 176-77 & n.2.
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straints.1° 1 Needless to say, defining the public policy limitations upon
the scope of § 145(f) is a difficult and unpredictable task. 10 2
Most commentators agree that the other substantive provisions of
§ 145 are an authoritative statement of Delaware public policy regarding
corporate indemnification.10 3 While no Delaware court has specifically
101. See BALoTri & FiIJKE.LSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.16, at 197-98 ("Although
there is no case law on point, it is probable that a Delaware court would not allow
indemnification under a by-law or pursuant to a contract when the proposed in-
demnification is prohibited by law or public policy."); Arsht, supra note 5, at 176-77
("Subsection (f), the non-exclusive clause, permits additional rights to be created,
but it is not a blanket authorization to indemnify directors against all expenses,
fines, or settlements of whatever nature and regardless of the director's conduct.
The statutory language is circumscribed by limits of public policy."); Bishop, Sitting
Ducks, supra note 2, at 1085 ("The Delaware draftsmen remark cryptically that
[§ 145(f)] was inserted 'so that other rights to indemnification may still exist by
contract, by-law or charter within such limits of public policy as the courts may
establish.'" (quoting Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 80)); Johnston, supra
note 5, at 1996 (noting that § 145(f) appears to contemplate "that a by-law or
agreement could be drafted which would provide more extensive protection to the
directors and officers than specified in the other provisions of the statute,
although there are undoubtedly public policy limitations on how far such a by-law
or agreement could go beyond the statutory formulation"); Klink et al., supra note
5, at 116 (noting that while it is unclear "[t]o what extent [the statute] provides or
permits additional rights of indemnification" it is most likely that such additional
rights would be "subject to whatever the applicable Delaware public policy" con-
cerning indemnification) ;John B. McAdams, A Proposal to Amend the Indemnification
Section (§ 5) of the Model Business Corporation Act, 31 Bus. LAw. 2123, 2126 n.23
(1976) ("Nonexclusive statutes are generally considered to be limited by public
policy."); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 414 ("[I]t is probable that a Delaware court
would not allow indemnification under a by-law or pursuant to a contract when the
proposed indemnification is prohibited by law or public policy.... [A] by-law or
agreement purporting to expand these limits would likely be void as violative of
public policy."); see also Mooney, 204 F.2d at 896 (noting that by-law must "have met
the requirements of public policy by the realistic limits they set upon the right of
indemnification" under statutory predecessor to § 145(0)).
102. See SctHAErLER, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that use of§ 145(13 "result[s]
in difficult problems involving public policy and interpretation"); see also Waltuch
v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 833 F. Supp. 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that
it is "difficult... to define precisely what limitations on indemnification public
policy imposes"), affd in part, rev'd in part by 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
The divergent holdings of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in PepsiCo and Waltuch are illustrative of the unpredictability involved in inter-
preting the nonexclusivity clause. At one end of the spectrum, the court in PepsiCo
interpreted subsection (0) as a plenary grant of power which, in effect, trumped
the other provisions of the statute which the court deemed merely "fall back" pro-
visions. PepsiCo, 640 F. Supp. at 661. Seven years later, in Waltuch, the same court
held that subsection (0) did not trump the other provisions of the statute, but
instead, was directly limited by those provisions. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 308-09.
To make matters even more unstable, no Delaware court has explicitly dealt with
the issue of the interplay between subsection (0) and public policy. See Waltuch, 88
F.3d at 91 ("No Delaware Court has decided the very issue presented here.").
103. Klink et al., supra note 5, at 128. One commentator has noted how the
rest of § 145 limits the exercise of subsection (0)'s grant of additional discretion:
The first five subsections of Section 145 represent an attempt to clarify
and expand the permissible scope of indemnification under Delaware
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addressed this issue, the applicable cases appear to support the idea that
law. They are an affirmative statement of the public policy of the State of
Delaware and should be so construed should the occasion arise.... How-
ever, Section 145 does not attempt to define with precision the full scope
of permissible indemnification, and therefore, the bounds of public pol-
icy.... [Tihere may be instances apart from those contemplated in Sub-
sections (a) to (e) of Section 145 where a Delaware corporation could
indemnify, and public policy, as developed in the course of time on a case
by case basis, would come into play in those instances as the determinant
of their validity.
Id. at 127-28; see also BALOTri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 187 (noting
that corporations can make items permissive under subsections (a) through (e)
mandatory through the use of subsection (f) but that such provision would not be
enforceable if it is "barred by other provisions of Section 145, other laws or public pol-
icy" (emphasis added)); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.07 (noting that subsec-
tion (f) "allows a corporation to provide procedural mechanics so long as they are not
inconsistent with the statutoy indemnification provisions" (emphasis added)). Indeed,
the principal drafters of the original Model Business Corporation Act, upon which
the Delaware statute was based, believed that "courts will be guided by 'public pol-
icy considerations, possibly in light of the substantive provisions of the statute' in decid-
ing whether to enforce, for example, a by-law which goes beyond the statute's
scope." Bishop, Sitting Ducks, supra note 2, at 1085 (quoting Sebring, Recent Legisla-
tive Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAW.
95, 107-09 (1967)) (emphasis added). Both the Southern District of New York and
the Second Circuit held that any agreement to indemnify pursuant to subsection
(f) had to be consistent with the other substantive provisions of § 145. See Waltuch,
88 F.3d at 90-94 (arguing that there is "a consistency rule" to § 145 requiring that
use of subsection (f) be consistent with other provisions of statute); Waltuch, 833 F.
Supp. at 309 (arguing § 145(f) "does not permit indemnification without regard to
the limitations set forth in the other subsections of Section 145"). For further
discussion of the Second Circuit's reasoning in formulating this "rule of consis-
tency," see infra notes 136-62 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the
Second Circuit's construction of subsection (f), see infra notes 180-89 and accom-
panying text.
Some state statutes have taken a different approach: expressly limiting their
nonexclusivity clauses in certain circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 204(a)(10)-(11), 3 17 (g) (West 1996) (declaring statute nonexclusive but sub-
ject to list of limitations in § 204(a) (11)); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0850(7) (1995) (pro-
viding statute not exclusive of other indemnification rights but limited where
director acted unlawfully, for improper personal benefit, willful misconduct or
conscious disregard for best interests of corporation); IOWA CODE § 490.858 (1995)
(providing statute not exclusive but subject to limitations similar to Florida stat-
ute). New York for example, declares its indemnification statute nonexclusive but
specifically prohibits a corporation from indemnifying an individual from ex-
penses incurred if the final adjudication "establishes that [the individual's] acts
were committed in bad faith." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (Consol. 1995).
At the other end of the spectrum, Pennsylvania's nonexclusivity provision ap-
pears to convey virtually unlimited authority upon corporations to indemnify.
CHEW, supra note 2, at 239 (citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1746(c) (West 1996)).
Section 1746(c) of the Pennsylvania code provides that a corporation may agree to
indemnify its officers or directors "whether or not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify the person under any other provision of law except as pro-
vided in this section." 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1746(c). Further, § 1746(c) de-
clares that such indemnification is "consistent with the public policy" of the
Commonwealth. Id. The "except as provided in this section" limitation simply
precludes a corporation from agreeing to indemnify for "willful misconduct or
recklessness." Id. § 1746(b).
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/5
1997] NOTE 251
the other substantive provisions of § 145 limit the scope of subsection
(f).104 Thus, any agreement purportedly authorized by subsection (f) will
104. See Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 823 (Del. 1992) (deny-
ing corporation's claim that indemnification agreement could be inconsistent with
§ 145); Hibbert, 475 A.2d at 344 (upholding interpretation of corporate by-law to
indemnify officers for expenses as plaintiffs, in part because it was "consistent" with
subsection (a)). But see PepsiCo, 640 F. Supp. at 661 (characterizing subsections (a)
and (b) as mere "backstop" provisions).
In Hibbert, a number of directors sought indemnification under a by-law for
expenses incurred in an action they brought as plaintiffs against the corporation.
Hibbert, 475 A.2d at 340. The by-law read in relevant part:
Every person who is or was a director . .. shall be indemnified by the
Corporation against any and all liability and reasonable expense that may
be incurred by him in connection with or resulting from any claim, ac-
tion, suit or proceeding ... in which he may be involved, as a party or
otherwise, by reason of his being or having been a director, officer or
employee of the Corporation . . .provided such person acted, in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the Corporation.
Id. at 341 n.1. The corporation claimed the proper interpretation of the by-law was
that it applied only to defense expenses. Id. at 341-42. The court, however, dis-
agreed, construing the term "party" to include plaintiffs as well as defendants. Id.
at 343. More importantly, the court noted that the corporation could "grant in-
demnification rights beyond those provided by the statute" and that the by-law was
consistent with § 145(a) which also uses the term "party" to legal proceeding. Id.
at 344.
In Citadel the corporation had provided for indemnification "to the full ex-
tent permitted by the General Corporation Law of Delaware" in its by-laws and had
entered into a separate indemnification agreement with a director providing for
mandatory advancement of expenses. Citade 603 A.2d at 823. Section 145(e) of
the Delaware Code specifically allows corporations to agree to advance expenses to
directors and officers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1994). The corporation
argued that the agreement to indemnify was an example of the "other rights to
indemnification" that § 145(f) explicitly protects and preserves, and that even if
the Delaware Legislature repealed § 145(e) authorizing advancement of expenses,
the director would still be entitled to such indemnification through the nonex-
clusivity provision. Citadel, 603 A.2d at 823. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected
this line of reasoning stating that: "Private parties may not circumvent the legisla-
tive will simply by agreeing to do so." Id. Notably, the Delaware Supreme Court
did not challenge the proposition that the contract between the corporation and
the director to provide for mandatory advancement of expenses was a valid exer-
cise of subsection (f). Id. Rather, the court simply disagreed with the corpora-
tion's hypothetical argument that the contract would remain enforceable if the
legislature repealed subsection (e). Id.
The lone dissenting voice on this issue appears in dicta in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York's decision in PepsiCo. PepsiCo, 640 F. Supp. at 661. There, the
court characterized subsections (a) and (b) as mere "'fall back' provisions that a
corporation may or may not adopt" through the use of subsection (f). Id. On the
whole, however, PepsiCo is not considered very persuasive as to the scope of
§ 145(f). But see Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 92 n.8 (disagreeing explicitly with holding in
PepsiCo). Most commentators have frowned upon the court's loose language. See,
e.g., BALOTn & FINKEISTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.16, at 198 ("It is doubtful that a
Delaware court would be quite this sweeping in its language in a case properly
presented to it involving the outer limits of the authority provided in section
145(f)."). Moreover, it is arguable that the court's statement is not opposed to the
proposition that subsection (f) is limited. The court said that subsections (a) and
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only be valid in so far as it is consistent with the other provisions of the
section. 105
In addition to the express provisions of the statute, there are other
sources of public policy that operate to preclude a corporation from in-
demnifying directors and officers under certain circumstances.1 0 6 For in-
stance, subsection (f) would not authorize a corporation to indemnify its
directors and officers who have been found liable for violations of federal
securities laws.10 7 Furthermore, public policy prohibits a corporation
(b) could be adopted at the discretion of the corporation and this is completely
consistent with the concept of permissive indemnification. For a discussion of per-
missive indemnification under subsections (a) and (b), see supra notes 65-95 and
accompanying text. Moreover, this is precisely what most corporations, including
the one in PepsiCo, achieve by providing that indemnification shall be provided to
the "full extent permissible by law." For a discussion of such clauses, see authori-
ties cited infra note 112.
105. See BALorri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 187 (noting that sub-
section (f) is limited by other subsections of § 145); Klink et al., supra note 5, at
127 (noting that first five subsections of § 145 limit exercise of subsection (f)).
The Delaware Code specifically limits the subject matter of the provisions that a
corporation may include in its certificate of incorporation and by-laws. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (1) (limiting content of certificate of incorpora-
tion); id. § 109(b) (limiting content of by-laws). Section 102(b)(1) states that "a
certificate of incorporation may also contain... any provision creating, defining,
limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation ... if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State." Id. § 102(b)(1). Section 109(b) places a similar
limitation upon the content of corporate by-laws stating that they may contain "any
rovision not inconsistent with law or the certificate of incorporation." Id.
109(b). The first five subsections of § 145 are "the laws" of Delaware. Id.
§ 109(a)-(e). Thus, any attempt to use subsection (f)'s nonexclusivity proclama-
tion to support a by-law or certificate provision would be "inconsistent" with the
law of Delaware and invalid. See Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 306 (arguing similarly).
The accuracy of this position is demonstrated by the fact that if subsection (f) were
deemed a plenary grant of permissive power to corporations to indemnify their
officers and directors in any circumstance, there would be no need for subsections
(a) and (b). Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 91; see Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 309 ("[T]here
would be no point to the carefully crafted provisions of Section 145 spelling out
the permissible scope of indemnification under Delaware law if subsection (f) al-
lowed indemnification in additional circumstances without regard to these limits.
The exception would swallow the rule." (emphasis added)). By way of example, if a
corporation could use subsection (f) to provide for indemnification of amounts
paid in satisfaction of judgments or settlements in derivative suits, then there
would be no conceivable purpose for having subsection (b) at all. See Sparks et al.,
supra note 3, at 976 ("[I] ndemnification which is uncategorically prohibited under
subsections (a) and (b) such as amounts paid in judgment or settlement of deriva-
tive actions ... are contrary to public policy and hence cannot be the subject of
subsection (f) indemnification.").
106. For a discussion of other sources of public policy limiting the use of sub-
section (f), see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
107. See BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE, supra note 5, § 6.16, at 6-30
(noting that because Securities Act of 1933 does not provide for indemnification
"courts have held that there is no federal right to indemnification" in such ac-
tions); CHEW, supra note 2, at 230-31 ("[ljndemnification for any liability arising
under the Securities Act of 1933 is contrary to public policy."). See, e.g., King v.
Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding no right to indemnification under
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from indemnifying its directors and officers for intentional illegal con-
duct.10 8 Given these public policy limitations, it is clear that subsection (f)
is not a plenary grant of authority to Delaware corporations to indemnify
their directors and officers however they see fit, but instead allows for an
expansion of the statutory power to indemnify only where to do so would
be consistent with the statute and applicable public policy.' 0 9
While it is clear that subsection (f) is limited by public policy, those
limitations do not render that section impotent. Subsection (f) still pro-
vides a corporation with the authority to provide broader indemnification
rights than those provided elsewhere in § 145, even under the public pol-
icy constraints." 0 Through the use of the nonexclusivity provision, a cor-
federal securities laws); Globus v. Law Research Servs. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288
(2d Cir. 1969) (same). For an in-depth discussion of federal securities laws limita-
tions upon indemnification of directors and officers, see Allan Applebaum & Rob-
ert A. McDowell, Indemnification Against Securities Acts Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 131
(1972); Bishop, New Problems, supra note 2; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 953-57;
David B. Schultz, Comment, Indemnification of Directors and Officers Against Liabilities
Imposed Under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 1043 (1995).
108. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 297-98 ("Public policy prohibits
indemnification of corporate officers for intentional illegal conduct."); see also CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 204(10)-(11), 3 17 (g) (prohibiting corporations from indemnifying
individuals for "acts or omissions that involve intentional misconduct"); FLA. STAT.
ch. 607.0850(7) (d) (prohibiting corporations from indemnifying for "willful mis-
conduct"); IOWA CODE § 490.858 (providing corporation may not provide indem-
nification for "intentional misconduct"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-57(a) (1995)
(allowing corporations to provide additional indemnification except "that a corpo-
ration may not indemnify or agree to indemnify a person against liability or ex-
pense he may incur on account of his activities which were at the time taken
known or believed by him to be clearly in conflict with the best interests of the
corporation"); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1746(b) (providing that corporations
may not "provide for indemnification in the case of willful misconduct or reckless-
ness"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-509(a)(2) (1996) (prohibiting indemnification
where individual has been adjudged liable for "intentional misconduct"); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-704 (Michie 1996) (prohibiting indemnification for expenses
incurred in "willful misconduct").
109. See Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 975 (discussing applicability of subsec-
tion (f) and stating that it is understood by "Delaware practitioners as permitting
indemnification broader than that authorized in [subsection] (a)-(e) only in lim-
ited circumstances" and is subject to public policy); see also Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 87
(holding any use of subsection (f) must be consistent with other substantive provi-
sions of statute).
110. See BALo-ri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.16, at 196-200.1 (discussing
permissible expansions of indemnification under subsection (f)); KNEPPER & BA-
LEY, supra note 2, at 308-09 (listing 29 allowable expansions of indemnification
through nonexclusivity provisions); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 415 (providing
list of permissible expansions of indemnification pursuant to § 145(f) that are con-
sistent with public policy); see also Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339,
344 (Del. 1983) (listing "other rights" to indemnification consistent with statute
and public policy that corporations can provide). In the Waltuch district court
opinion, Judge Lasker noted that, notwithstanding public policy constraints,
§ 145(f) "still 'may authorize the adoption of various procedures and presump-
tions to make the process of indemnification more favorable to the indemnitee
without violating the statute."' Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 309 (quoting R. FRANKLIN
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poration may make mandatory many of the items that are simply
permissible under the statute.1"1 Many corporations achieve this result by
including a provision in its certificate or by-laws that the corporation will
provide indemnification to its directors and officers "to the fullest extent
permissible by law."112
2. Mandatory Indemnification
Section 145(c) of the Delaware Code defines a specific set of circum-
stances under which indemnification is mandatory.'1 3 This section re-
quires a corporation to indemnify directors and officers for expenses
incurred when they have been "successful on the merits or otherwise" in
BALo-Ir & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 4.16, at 4-318 (2d ed. Supp. 1992)).
111. See Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 823 (Del. 1992) (en-
forcing agreement between corporation and officer to make advancements of ex-
penses to director because corporation made what was permissive under § 145(d)
mandatory through agreement); see also B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 787, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (construing Pennsylvania nonexclusivity provision
as allowing corporation to make that which is permissive under statute mandatory
in its by-laws).
112. See Pease, supra note 2, at 172-73 (noting that corporations commonly
make what is permissible under subsections (a) and (b) mandatory by inserting "a
bylaw provision which states that 'to the full extent permitted by law, the corpora-
tion shall indemnify"'); Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 958-60 (discussing creation of
"broader mandatory indemnification than that required by statute" through use of
"fullest extent" provision).
113. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1994). Section 145(c) provides:
To the extent that a director, officer, employee or agent of a corporation
has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action,
suit or proceeding referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, he shall be indemni-
fied against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably
incurred by him in connection therewith.
Id.
For examples of mandatory indemnification statutes in other states, see ARIz.
REv. STAT. § 10-005(C) (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-850(C) (Michie 1995); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 317(d); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-772 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch.
607.0850(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-852 (1996); 805 IlL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.75(c)(West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-9 (Michie 1996); IowA CODE § 490.852; N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 723(a) (Consol. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-52; 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1743; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-520 (Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-18-503; TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1 (H) (West 1996); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-698; WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.520 (West 1995); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-9(c) (1996). The Revised Model Business Corporation Act also con-
tains a mandatory indemnification provision. See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.§ 8.52 (1994).
For an in-depth discussion of mandatory indemnification, see BALOTrI & FIN-
KELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 185-87; BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE,
supra note 5, § 6.26, at 6-41 to 6-45; CHEW, supra note 2, at 234-234.1; FERRARA ET
AL., supra note 5, § 12.04; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 302-04; Monteleone &
Conca, supra note 5, at 574-82; Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 957-60.
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defending against an action.' 14 This section applies in the event of a suc-
cessful defense to both actions brought by a third party and those brought
by or in the right of the corporation.' 15 Courts have liberally construed
this section to provide corporate directors and officers with the broadest
protection possible when they have successfully defended against a claim
or action. 116 In contrast to subsections (a) and (b), this subsection re-
quires no action on the part of the corporation for the right to indemnifi-
cation to vest. 1 7 Under § 145(c), a director or officer is entitled to
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c). Some courts at common law also per-
mitted indemnification for expenses incurred in a successful defense.
115. Id. Section 145(c) explicitly provides that mandatory indemnification is
triggered upon the successful defense "of any action, suit or proceeding referred
to in subsections (a) and (b) of this subsection, or in defense of any claim, issue or
matter therein." Id. Thus, mandatory indemnification under § 145(c) applies
equally to the successful defense of suits brought by third parties and those
brought by or in the right of the corporation (e.g., derivative suits). See WELCH &
TuREzmN, supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249 (noting that subsection (c) applies to any
successful defense and action "whether it be a third party action or a derivative
suit").
116. See, e.g., Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The
Delaware courts and legislature under state law have chosen to provide broad stat-
utory indemnification protection in situations where a corporate officer or direc-
tor successfully defends against claims."); McLean v. International Harvester Co.,
902 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding officer entitled to mandatory indemni-
fication for expenses incurred in expungement action to remove name from rec-
ord of another proceeding notwithstanding fact that officer lost expungement
action but nonetheless succeeded in defending criminal action that caused him to
seek expungement); Stewart v. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc., 414
N.Y.S.2d 910, 915 (App. Div. 1979) (upholding mandatory indemnification for ex-
penses incurred by director summoned to testify before federal grand jury who was
never ultimately indicted; finding director successful on merits or otherwise); see
also Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 957 (citing Green v. Westcap, 492 A.2d 260 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1985)) ("The phrase 'successful on the merits or otherwise' has been
construed broadly by courts in Delaware and elsewhere.").
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(c). For a discussion of the permissive
nature of § 145(a) and (b), see supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text. Subsec-
tions (a) and (b) are enabling provisions that conclusively establish that corpora-
tions have the authority to agree to indemnify their directors, officers and others.
SeeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b). Typically, this agreement takes the form of
a provision in the corporation's certificate of incorporation or its by-laws. Thus,
§ 145(a) and (b) do not, in and of themselves, create a right to indemnity, but
rather, they require some action on the part of the corporation. In contrast, in-
demnification under § 145(c) is always available regardless of the content of the
corporate by-laws or the certificate of incorporation. The statute provides that a
corporation "shall" indemnify an officer or director "to the extent that [they have
been] successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action suit or pro-
ceeding referred to in subsections (a) and (b), or in defense of any claim, issue or
matter therein." Id. § 145(c). Thus, indemnification under subsection (c) is a
matter of right wholly independent of corporate action. See BALorrI & FINKEL-
STEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 (noting that "the indemnitee [is] to be indemni-
fied as a matter of right in the event he wins ajudgment on the merits"); WELCH &
TuREZY , supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249 (noting that "the right to indemnity under
[§ 145(c)] is mandatory" and that it vests at "successful conclusion of the action");
Beveridge, supra note 51, at 750-51 ("[A director's] right to indemnity is absolute
in the event of a successful defense.").
1997] NOTE
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indemnification once he or she has successfully defended against an ac-,
tion or claim, irrespective of the corporation's by-laws or certificate of in-
corporation. 118 Additionally, mandatory indemnification is limited to
successful defense expenses and, thus, will never include amounts paid in
satisfaction of a judgment or settlement.1 19
Any claim for indemnification under § 145(c) requires the claimant
to establish that he or she was "successful" within the meaning of that term
as used in the statute. 120 Two characteristics have defined the parameters
of success under subsection (c).121 First, a termination of legal proceed-
ings will be deemed successful under the statute only if it is final. 122 A full
defense resulting in a total victory on the merits with resjudicata effect will
always satisfy the success requirement of the statute. 123 A technical or pro-
cedural defense, such as the running of the statute of limitations, will also
In contrast, some states have enacted mandatory indemnification frameworks
that do not guarantee indemnification as a matter of right upon the successful
defense of an action. Instead, these states have created a default rule of mandatory
indemnification that corporations can opt-out of in their certificate, articles or
charter. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-772; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-9; IowA
CODE § 490.852; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-52; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-520; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-18-503; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-698; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.520.
For example, the Indiana statute provides:
Unless limited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall indemnify a
director who was wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the
defense of any proceeding to which the director was a party because the
director is or was a director of the corporation against reasonable ex-
pense incurred by the director in connection with the proceeding.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-9 (emphasis added).
118. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 302 (noting that under subsection
(c) "the right [to indemnification] is absolute and the statute is self- activating");
WELCH & TuRmz N, supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249 (noting that right to mandatory
indemnification vests upon successful conclusion of action); Monteleone & Conca,
supra note 5, at 575 ("The purpose of the mandatory indemnification provision is
to give vindicated directors and officers a judicially enforceable right to
indemnification.").
119. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 ("Mandatory indemnification is
generally required when a director or officer has successfully defended a claim.
Consequently, mandatory indemnification is largely limited to defense expenses
(such as attorneys' fees and costs) as opposed to damage awards."). Indemnifica-
tion under subsection (c) is not permitted if an officer or director has paid any
amounts in settlement or assumed any liability because such payments are deemed
to abrogate the "success" requirement of the section. For a discussion of this non-
payment requirement to mandatory indemnification, see infra notes 127-29 and
accompanying text.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c).
121. For a discussion of the two characterstics that have defined "success"
under the statute, see infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
122. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 302 ("There is an element of final-
ity in the success provision of the statute.").
123. See BALOTri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 ("The effect of
[§ 145(c)] in the case of total victory on the merits is clear."); Veasey et al., supra
note 2, at 406 (noting that result "in the case of total victory on the merits is
clear").
256
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be deemed a final success. 124 Although there is no Delaware precedent
directly on point, most commentators agree that a settlement and dismis-
sal with prejudice of an action will also satisfy the finality requirement of
success under the statute. 12 5 A settlement and dismissal without preju-
124. See BALOTn & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 (stating that
phrase "'[o]n the merits or otherwise,' permits the indemnitee to be indemnified
as a matter of right in the event he... successfully asserts a 'technical' defense");
CHEW, supra note 2, at 234 ("The inclusion of the word 'otherwise' permits defend-
ants who succeed on procedural defenses, such as statue of limitations arguments,
to be indemnified."); WELCH & TuREzVN, supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249 (noting that
"a preliminary technical defense will suffice" for "success" requirement); Klink et
al., supra note 5, at 116 (noting term "'otherwise' would include situations where
an action is dismissed based on the statute of limitations").
The district court in Waltuch acknowledged this rule when it required Conti to
reimburse Waltuch for the expenses he incurred in defending the Michelson suit.
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
affid in part, rev'd in part by 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996). The Michelson suit was dis-
missed for insufficient process, a traditional technical defense. Michelson v. Merril
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The district
court held that this technical defense satisfied the "success" requirement under
§ 145(c). Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 310.
The asserted rationale for allowing technical defenses is that it would be un-
reasonable to require a claimant to go through the lengthy and expensive process
of presenting a full defense on the merits in order to establish his or her eligibility
for mandatory indemnification. CHEW, supra note 2, at 234 ("The drafters believe
it is unreasonable to require directors and officers to incur the expense of proving
their case on the merits, when a successful [technical] defense is available.");
WELCH & TuRaEzvN, supra note 5, § 145.4, at 249 (noting that allowing for technical
defenses "avoids forcing on a director or officer (and ultimately on the indemnify-
ing corporation) the additional expense of litigating an issue on the merits where
a preliminary technical defense will suffice"). Occasionally, a defendant who has
engaged in misconduct will be able to assert a technical defense and reap the
benefit of mandatory indemnification, nonetheless, it is still deemed unreasonable
to require a defendant to submit to the expensive and time consuming process of a
full determination on the merits. See Block et al., supra note 50, at 242 (noting
defendant "who has in fact done something wrong may be 'entitled to indemnifi-
cation"' through technical defense because it is unreasonable to require "pro-
longed and expensive trial on the merits in order to establish eligibility for
mandatory indemnification"'). The Revised Model Business Corporation Act also
provides for mandatory indemnification as the result of a successful technical de-
fense. REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.52 cmt. (1994) The comments to § 8.52
provide, in pertinent part:
While this standard may result in an occasional defendant becoming enti-
fled to indemnification because of procedural defenses not related to the
merits ... it is unreasonable to require a defendant with a valid proce-
dural defense to undergo a possibly prolonged and expensive trial on the
merits in order to establish eligibility for mandatory indemnification.
Id. But see Klink et al., supra note 5, at 111-12 (noting "there would be less than
complete agreement... that a successful technical defense.., should give rise to a
right to indemnification"); McAdams, supra note 101, at 2135-36 (proposing
amendment to Model Act requiring establishment of good faith and best interests
for mandatory indemnification).
125. SeeBALoTTi & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 (noting that § 145
"contemplates the dismissal of the suit in conjunction with a negotiated settlement
where the dismissal is with prejudice and without any payment or assumption of
liability"); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 (noting that "the 'or otherwise'
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dice, however, is not sufficient for the purposes of the statute because it
lacks the necessary element of finality. 126 ,
Second, the successful conclusion of the underlying suit for which
indemnification is sought must have been achieved without any payment
or assumption of liability by the defendant director or officer who is now a
claimant seeking indemnification.1 27 As a practical matter, this condition
to qualifying for "success" under the statute is an issue only when the origi-
language has been found not to support mandatory indemnification ... when a
matter is dismissed with prejudice as a result of a settlement" without any pay-
ment); Beveridge, supra note 51, at 751-52 ("Where a case is settled and dismissed
with prejudice without any payment [then the defendant] has been successful for
purposes of indemnification."); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 575 ("[A]
settlement that is with prejudice and results in the dismissal of the case without any
payment or assumption of liability may be considered a 'success' within the mean-
ing of that provision."); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at 406-07 ("The phrase found in
section 145(c), 'on the merits or otherwise,' . . . contemplates the dismissal of the
suit in conjunction with a negotiated settlement where the dismissal is with preju-
dice and without any payment or assumption of liability."). Two non-Delaware
courts interpreting statutes virtually identical to subsection (c) have concluded
that a dismissal of an action with prejudice and without payment is success under
their respective statutes. Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d
Cir. 1978) (interpreting Illinois law, which is substantially similar to § 145(c), and
holding that language "success 'on the merits or otherwise,' [was] surely broad
enough to cover a termination of claims by agreement without any payment"); B &
B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 791 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (inter-
preting language of Pennsylvania statute similar to § 145(c) and holding settle-
ment without payment resulting in dismissal with prejudice satisfied "successful on
the merits or otherwise" requirement of statute).
It is important to note, however, that a dismissal with prejudice that is accom-
panied by any payment in settlement by the defendant will not meet the "success"
requirement of the statute notwithstanding the fact that the claim has been dis-
posed of with clear finality. For a further discussion of settlement payment issues,
see infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
126. See Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D. Del. 1973) (denying
mandatory indemnification and stating "when a case is dismissed without preju-
dice so that the same issue may be litigated in another pending case, an indemnifi-
cation award would be premature and contrary to the spirit of the statute");
BALoTTi & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 ("A dismissal without prejudice
... is insufficient to invoke mandatory indemnification under the statute."); Mon-
teleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 575 ("Settlements that are without prejudice to a
claimant's right to assert further claims against an officer are not 'successes' under
section 145(c) of the Delaware statute.").
127. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 ("When . . . an action is dis-
missed as part of a settlement in which money is paid by or on behalf of the party
seeking indemnification, mandatory indemnification has been found not to lie.").
The Second Circuit's holding in Waltuch clearly establishes this rule. Waltuch, 88
F.3d at 96 (holding dismissal of action with prejudice without payment by claimant
constitutes "success" under § 145(c)); see also Wisener, 583 F.2d at 583 (interpreting
identical Illinois statute stating "success on the merits or otherwise" includes settle-
ment without payment that results in dismissal with prejudice); B & B Inv. Club,
472 F. Supp at 791 (holding settlement without payment by claimant resulting in
dismissal with prejudice of action constitutes success under Pennsylvania statute
identical to subsection (c)).
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nal action was concluded by settlement.1 2 8 Synthesizing the above, it is
clear that in order for a settlement to qualify as a "success" under § 145(c),
it must result in a dismissal with prejudice without any payment or assump-
tion of liability by the defendant director or officer.129
Mandatory indemnification under subsection (c) does not require
that a defendant succeed "on the merits or otherwise" with respect to all
claims asserted. 130 Rather, subsection (c) requires that a director or of-
ficer be "successful on the merits or otherwise" in defending against either
the entire legal proceedings or, in the alternative, against "any claim, issue
or matter therein. ' 13 1 One court has interpreted this language to allow
for mandatory indemnification when the defendant has only been par-
128. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 575 (noting that "most D&O
claims are settled" and that only "a settlement that is with prejudice and without
any payment or assumption of liability may be considered a 'success' within the
meaning of [the] provision"). Obviously, the payment or assumption of liability
never becomes an issue when a defendant has prevailed on the merits at trial or
has succeeded in asserting a technical defense. For a further discussion of the
effect of a successful defense at trial or through technical defenses, see supra notes
123-24 and accompanying text.
129. BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 (noting that § 145
"contemplates the dismissal of the suit in conjunction with a negotiated settlement
where the dismissal is with prejudice and without any payment or assumption of
liability"); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 (noting that "or otherwise" lan-
guage of subsection (c) has been found to include actions dismissed with prejudice
as long as "the settlement was not the result of any payment by or on behalf of the
indemnified party"); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 302 ("The statute is broad
enough to cover a termination of actions by agreement without any payment or
assumption of liability.").
Before the district court and Second Circuit opinions in Waltuch, no court had
interpreted § 145(c) in a claim arising out of a civil action settlement. Waltuch, 88
F.3d at 95. In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974), however, one lower Delaware court had applied § 145(c) to a settlement
in a criminal action. Id. at 141. In Wolfson, the agents of a corporation were
charged with several criminal counts which they settled with the prosecution by
agreeing to plead nolo contendere as to one count in exchange for a dismissal of
the remaining counts. Id. at 140. Following the "settlement," the agents brought
an action under § 145(c) claiming the corporation was required to indemnify
them for expenses incurred in defending the counts that were dismissed. Id. at
143. The agents argued that their dismissal constituted "success" under § 145(c),
and therefore, indemnification was required. Id. The corporation contended that
the agents had not been "successful" because the dismissals were part of a settle-
ment that was contingent upon their pleading nolo contendere to one count, and
therefore, the dismissals were the result of practical considerations and not a find-
ing of innocence on their part. Id. The court agreed with the agents, and deemed
the dismissals "successes" and refused to "go behind the result" to determine the
reason for the success. Id. at 141. The court in Wolfson stated: "In a criminal ac-
tion, any result other than conviction must be considered success. Going behind
the result, as [the corporation] attempts, is neither authorized by subsection (c)
nor consistent with the presumption of innocence." Id.
130. Beveridge, supra note 51, at 751 ("Generally, any successful defense, in
whole or in part (in which case fees are prorated), has been held to qualify [under
§ 145(c)].").
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1994).
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tially successful in defending the underlying suit in a criminal action.13 2
Thus, in Delaware, a director or officer is entitled to indemnification for
the expenses associated with those claims or issues that he or she success-
fully defended against, notwithstanding the fact that he or she did not
succeed with respect to other claims or issues.
133
132. Wolfson, 321 A.2d at 141. In Wolfson, the Delaware Superior Court held
that an officer was entitled to indemnification under § 145(c) for the expenses
incurred in defending the three out of four criminal counts that were dismissed
notwithstanding his having pled nolo contendere to the fourth. Id. The court
stated its reasoning as follows:
The statute requires indemnification to the extent that the claimant "has
been successful on the merits or otherwise." Success is vindication. In a
criminal action, any result other than conviction must be considered suc-
cess.... The statute does not require complete success. It provides for
indemnification to the extent of success "in defense of any claim, issue or
matter" in an action. Claimants are therefore entitled to partial indemni-
fication if successful on a count of an indictment, which is an independ-
ent criminal charge, even if unsuccessful on another, related count.
Id.; see also CHEW, supra note 2, at 234 (stating that because § 145(c) requires only
that defendants be "successful" that "[i] t consequently allows partial indemnifica-
tion for partial successes"); Block et al., supra note 50, at 241 (noting that § 145(c)
"mandates partial indemnification in cases of partial success").
133. See FERRARA ET AL., Supra note 5, § 12.04 (noting that under subsection
(c) indemnification may be required where an individual "has successfully de-
fended some of the claims brought against him, but has been adjudged liable or
acknowledged liability for other claims"); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at
575-76 ("[S]o long as the person to be indemnified is partially successful on the
merits, he or she may be partially indemnified for expenses incurred in connec-
tion with the claims or allegations that were successfully defended .... [E]ven if
... unsuccessful in defending other claims asserted against him or her.").
Approximately one-third of the states follow the Delaware partial indemnifica-
tion approach. Id. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 10-005(C) (1996); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-27-850(C) (Michie 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1996); FLA. STAT.
ch. 607.0850(3) (1995); 805 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/8.75(c) (West 1996); N.Y. Bus.
CoR. LAW § 723(a) (Consol. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1743 (West 1996);
W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(c) (1996). In contrast, many states follow the approach of
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("Model Act") and the American Law
Institute's (ALI's) Principles of Corporate Governance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-772 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-852 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-9
(Michie 1996); IOWA CODE § 490.852 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-52 (1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-520 (Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-503
(1996); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02-1(H) (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23B.08.520 (West 1995). Virginia's statute requires that an indemnitee "en-
tirely prevails in the defense of any proceeding." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-698
(Michie 1996). These approaches both impose mandatory indemnification only
when a director or officer has been "wholly successful on the merits or otherwise"
in defending against an action. FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 (discussing
Model Act and ALI Principles). In fact, the Model Act adopted the "wholly suc-
cessful" standard to avoid precisely the result in Wolfson. See REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT § 8.52 cmt. (1994) ("The word wholly added to avoid the argument
accepted in [Wolfson] that a defendant may be entitled to partial mandatory in-
demnification."); see also Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 97,
at 113 (discussing new revisions to Model Act and noting that it specifically
changed wording to require directors be "'wholly successful' to avoid repetition of
the result in the Wolfson case").
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In contrast to permissive indemnification, it appears that there is no
requirement that a director or officer act in good faith or with a reason-
able belief that his or her actions were consistent with the best interests of
the corporation in order to receive mandatory indemnification.13 4 In-
stead, a director or officer need only demonstrate that he or she success-
fully defended against the claim that gave rise to the expenses that he or
she seeks to recover.'
3 5
134. See Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260, 264 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985)
(holding director successful in defense was entitled to indemnification and was not
required to establish good faith or reasonable belief). In Westcap, a corporate of-
ficer sought to recover expenses incurred in successfully defending against a crimi-
nal action brought against him by the State of Texas. Id. at 262. The corporation
resisted the claim for indemnification, claiming that § 145(c) incorporated the
tests of subsections (a) and (b), which require good faith and a reasonable belief
that the officer's actions were in or not opposed to the best interests of the corpo-
ration. Id. at 264. The court rejected the argument, holding that the only prereq-
uisite to mandatory indemnification is success on the merits or otherwise. Id. at
265. In so holding, the court stated:
In contrast to subsections (a) and (b), subsection (c) predicates recovery
on indemnitee's success "on the merits or otherwise in defense of the
proceeding." The distinction is understandable. Subsections (a) and (b)
do not require a priorjudicial determination of the validity of the indem-
nitee's position as to the proceeding for which indemnification is sought.
Hence, in the absence of success on the merits of the defense, there is a
requirement that specific factual prerequisites be established as a condi-
tion for indemnification. Subsection (c) applies only where there has
been a prior proceeding in which the lack of merit of the attack upon the
indemnitee has been established. In such case the director, officer, or
employee is entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred in resisting
the criminal charge against him if the prior proceeding arose by reason
of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, or employee of the
corporation.
Id.; see also KNEPPER & BMAUWE, supra note 2, at 302 ("The statutory standards for
permissive indemnification [i.e., good faith and reasonable belief] do not apply
when mandatory indemnification is in order.").
In contrast, some courts in other states construing similar statutes have denied
mandatory indemnification notwithstanding the claimant's unquestionable success
on the merits in defending the underlying action because of a lack of good faith
on the claimant's part in the conduct questioned in the underlying action. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Diamond, 120 N.E.2d 819, 821 (N.Y. 1954) (denying mandatory
indemnification notwithstanding director having been wholly successful in defend-
ing action because to do so "would place the statute in opposition to the funda-
mental principles not only of law but of good conscience and morals"); People v.
Uran Mine Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 985 (App. Div. 1961) (denying indemnification
where plaintiff had been successful in defending suit because of failure to prove
good faith).
One commentator has proposed amending the mandatory indemnification
provision of the old Model Act, which is substantially identical to § 145(c), to re-
quire a finding not only that the claimant was successful, but that he or she met
the standards applicable to permissive indemnification as well. McAdams, supra
note 101, at 2135-36. For a further discussion of good faith and mandatory in-
demnification, see infra note 206.
135. See Westcap, 492 A.2d at 265 (holding that only prerequisite to mandatory
indemnification is success on merits or otherwise); Monteleone & Conca, supra
note 5, at 575 ("The person to be indemnified need not demonstrate his or her
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.: Narrative Analysis
In Waltuch, the Second Circuit addressed two significant issues regard-
ing the scope of § 145.136 First, the court had to decide whether the sup-
plemental indemnification provision of subsection (f) gave Conti the
power to indemnify Waltuch even in the absence of good faith on his
part.13 7 Second, the court had to determine whether Waltuch's dismissal
with prejudice without any payment on his part as a result of Conti's settle-
ment was sufficient to entitle him to mandatory indemnification under
subsection (c). 138
1. The Scope of §145(t)
No Delaware court had directly considered the scope of additional
indemnification that could be provided pursuant to subsection (f).139
Notwithstanding the paucity of precedent, the Second Circuit discerned
what it termed a "rule of consistency" governing the use of subsection (f)
from the relevant case law, commentary and the court's own interpreta-
tion of the statute as a whole. 140 According to this rule, subsection (f)
could be used to provide directors and officers with additional rights to
indemnification other than those found in the statute, provided however,
own good faith or that he or she was free from wrongdoing, but only that the claim
asserted against him or her was without merit."); see also Wotfson, 321 A.2d at 138
(requiring only "success" in underlying suit to trigger § 145(c) in criminal case).
Similarly, the Second Circuit adopted a narrow definition of "success" under§ 145(c). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's treatment of the term "success"
in § 145(c), see infra notes 163-79 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of
the Second Circuit's interpretation of § 145(c), see infra notes 190-97 and accom-
panying text.
136. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1996).
For a further explanation of the facts and procedural history of the Waltuch appeal,
see supra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.
137. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 91. The competing interpretations advocated to the court by the
parties can be briefly summarized as follows. Waltuch argued that subsection (f0
was a separate grant of indemnification power allowing a corporation to provide
indemnification rights beyond those provided for in the other substantive provi-
sions of the statute. Id. at 89. Specifically, Waltuch argued that subsection (f)
allowed Conti to agree to indemnify him even if he had acted in bad faith. Id.
Conti countered that subsection (a) was the true source of a corporation's indem-
nification power, and that because subsection (a) contains a good faith require-
ment, Waltuch was not entitled to indemnification unless he could show he acted
in good faith. Id. at 89-90. For'a discussion of § 145(a) and its requirements, see
supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. Because Waltuch had elected to forgo a
trial on the merits as to his good faith, the Second Circuit entered its analysis
assuming Waltuch had acted with less than good faith. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 89.
140. See Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 91 (announcing "rule of 'consistency"'). For a
further discussion of the Second Circuit's reasoning in developing its "rule of con-
sistency," see supra notes 136-39, infra notes 141-62 and accompanying text.
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40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/5
that such rights would be valid only to the extent that they are consistent
with the other substantive provisions of the statute."'
The Second Circuit began its analysis by examining two decisions of
the Delaware Supreme Court interpreting § 145.142 The court acknowl-
edged that these cases did not deal directly with the scope of subsection
(f); nevertheless, the court asserted that these cases tended to support its
"rule of consistency.' 4 The court concluded that the language in these
opinions stood for two complimentary propositions which form the basis
of its "rule of consistency": "[I] ndemnification rights may be broader than
those set out in the statute but they cannot be inconsistent with the 'scope'
of the corporation's power to indemnify, as delineated in the statute's sub-
stantive provisions."' 44
Turning to the language of the statute itself, the court determined
that a reasonable reading of the statute as a whole reinforced the court's
view that a "rule of consistency" governed subsection (f).145 Central to the
court's construction of § 145 was the premise that § 145 is a legislative
grant of power to corporations.' 46 With this premise in mind, the court
primarily focused upon defining the structure and scope of that grant of
power.
Under the court's analysis of § 145, the residual power of a corpora-
tion to indemnify was found in subsections (a) and (b). 147 Of primary
significance to the court, these sections are clearly worded as grants of
power, explicitly stating "a corporation shall have power to indemnify." 148
141. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 91.
142. Id. at 91-92. The Second Circuit looked primarily at the Delaware
Supreme Court's holdings in Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818 (Del.
1992) and Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 475 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983). For a discus-
sion of these cases, see supra note 104.
143. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 91-92. Acknowledging the lack of precedent, the
court stated nonetheless that "the applicable cases tend to support the proposition
that a corporation's grant of indemnification rights cannot be inconsistent with
the substantive statutory provisions of section 145." Id. at 91.
144. Id. at 92. Further, the court characterized Citadel as standing for the
proposition that "the express limits in [§] 145's substantive provisions are not
subordinated to [§] 145(f)." Id.
145. Id. The court stated, "[tihe 'consistency' rule suggested by these Dela-
ware cases is reinforced by our reading of [§] 145 as a whole." Id.
146. See id. at 92-94 (construing § 145 as grant of power to indemnify). The
power of a corporation to indemnify its officers and directors was uncertain at
common law. Arsht, supra note 5, at 176. For a discussion of the common law on
corporate indemnification, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. State
statues such as § 145 of the Delaware Code were enacted to end the uncertainty at
common law by conclusively establishing the corporate power to indemnify. For a
further discussion of the purpose behind enacting indemnification statutes such as
§ 145, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
147. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 92-93 (stating that subsections (a) and (b) "expressly
grant a corporation the power to indemnify directors, officers and others").
148. Id. at 90 (emphasis added). In the opinion, the court recognized confu-
sion as to the precise wording of the statute. Id. at 90 n.6. There was a conflict
between the language of § 145(a) as originally enacted and the language as it ap-
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These grants are not plenary and unlimited, but rather, they are both sig-
nificantly circumscribed by the requirement that indemnification under
both subsections may not be provided unless the director or officer to be
indemnified "acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to
be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation."1 49 Thus,
the court noted that these provisions "limit the scope of the power they
confer."15 0 In contrast, subsection (f) is not a grant of power similar to
subsections (a) and (b).151 The language of subsection (f) does not speak
in terms of "corporate power," instead the court stated, § 145(f) "merely
acknowledges that one seeking indemnification may be entitled to 'other
rights.' 1 5 2 Because subsection (f) is not a separate grant of power, the
court reasoned that it cannot be read to free a corporation from the good
faith limit explicitly imposed upon the real grant of power to indemnify
found in subsections (a) and (b). 153
The Second Circuit noted that when the legislature "intended a sub-
section of [§] 145 to augment the powers limited in subsection (a), it set
out the additional powers expressly. 1 54 The court illustrated this point by
examining § 145(g), which states that "[a] corporation shall have powe?' to
provide insurance to protect a director and officer against any liability
"whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against
such liability under this section."155 According to the court, this subsection
pears codified in the Michie Company's popular compilation. Id. The language of
the original enactment of § 145(a) used the phrase "a corporation shall have
power to indemnify." 56 Del. Laws 50, § 1, at 170 (1967), codified at Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 145 (g) (1994). On the other hand, the popular codified version uses
the phrase "a corporation may indemnify." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a). Citing
Delaware precedent, the court resolved the conflict in favor of the original version.
Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 90 n.6 (citing Elliott v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 407 A.2d 524,
528 (Del. 1979) (recognizing that original language of enactment controls)).
Thus, the Second Circuit's interpretation of § 145(a) and (b) is premised upon
the language "a corporation shall have power to indemnify," which undeniably
connotates a grant of power. Id.
149. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 92. Under the court's analysis, a corporation cannot
claim § 145(a) or (b) as its source of authority to indemnify a director or officer
who has acted in bad faith or in a manner that he or she could not have reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. Id.
150. Id. The court expressly disagreed with the holding in PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), which characterized sub-
sections (a) and (b) as mere "backstop provisions." Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 93 n.8.
The court rejected the notion that subsections (a) and (b) were mere default rules
that subsection (f) could be used to opt-out of. Id. For a discussion of PepsiCo and
commentary on § 145(f)'s limitations, see supra notes 96-112 and accompanying
text.
151. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 92-93.
152. Id. at 93.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 5(g) (1994) (emphasis added). Section
14 5 (g) provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on
behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent
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"reflects the principle that corporations have the power under [§] 145 to
indemnify in some situations and not in others."1 56 Moreover, if subsec-
tion (f) were an unlimited plenary grant of power to indemnify, as Wal-
tuch contended, then the "whether or not" language of subsection (g)
would be utterly superfluous.15 7 Under the court's interpretation, the
"whether or not" language of subsection (g) must be referring to the limi-
tations upon corporate indemnity power set forth in subsections (a) and
(b), which include the good faith limitation.' 58
Finally, the court found additional support for its "rule of con-
sistency" in an article written by the principal drafter of the 1967
amendments to § 145, which added the good faith and best interests re-
quirements to subsections (a) and (b). 15 9 There, the author explained
that these requirements were specifically intended to limit a corporation's
power to indemnify.160 Thus, the court reasoned, subsection (f) could
not be interpreted as a separate grant of indemnity power because to do
so would be diametrically opposed to the legislative intent to limit such
power by incorporating the standard of conduct requirements in subsec-
tions (a) and (b).161 In short, the Second Circuit determined that Wal-
tuch's interpretation of the statute failed to make sense of the statute as a
whole.' 6 2
of the corporation . . . against any liability asserted against him and in-
curred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such,
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him
against such liability under this section.
56 Del. Laws 50, § 1, at 172 (1967), codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g).
156. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 93.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. 93-94 (citing Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 77-78). Arsht was
the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Delaware Corporation Law Revi-
sion Commission in 1967. Arsht, supra note 5, at 176 n.*.
160. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 93. Arsht & Stapleton's article, Delaware's New General
Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, supra note 56, is considered by many "to be
part of (if not all of) '[t] he legislative history to section 145." Waltuch, 88 F.3d at
94 n.9 (citation omitted). The authors noted that a great deal of uncertainty ex-
isted under § 145's predecessor as to the permissible scope of corporate indemnifi-
cation powers. Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 77-78. The authors also stated
that the good faith and best interests requirements were added as "limitations
which must necessarily be placed on the power to indemnify in order to prevent
the statute from undermining the substantive provisions of the criminal law and
corporation law." Id. at 78. More specifically, the drafters added the limitations to
protect the integrity of the duty of loyalty imposed upon a director and officer in
corporate law. Id.
161. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 94 n.9. The court recognized Arsht & Stapleton's
explanation that "the Legislature enacted the 'good faith' clause ... to make the
State's 'public policy' explicit: a corporation could not indemnify directors and
officers who breached their duty of loyalty to the corporation." Id.
162. Id. at 91. The court reasoned that if it accepted Waltuch's construction
of subsection (f) as a separate, unlimited grant of corporate power to indemnify in
any situation irrespective of the other substantive provisions of the statute, then
the other carefully crafted provisions of the statute would be unnecessary. Id. The
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2. Mandatory Indemnification Under § 145(c)
The second issue facing the court was whether the dismissal of the
private suits without any payment by Waltuch as a result of Conti's settle-
ment constituted "success" under § 145(c).163 The court initially noted
that no Delaware court had specifically applied § 145(c) to a claim arising
from the settlement and dismissal of a civil suit.16 4 In Merritt-Chapman &
Scott Corp. v. Wolfson,165 however, one lower Delaware court had applied
§ 145(c) to a settlement in a criminal action. 166 The Second Circuit inter-
preted the holding in Wolfson as adopting a narrow interpretation of "suc-
cess" stating that Wolfson stood for the proposition that "[e] scape from an
adverse judgment or other detriment, for whatever reason, is determinative"
as to whether a party has been "successful" under § 145(c). 1 6 7 Accord-
ingly, the court reasoned, the "only question" a court considering a claim
court called the district court's opinion a "thorough and scholarly opinion," and it
approvingly quoted the following:
[T]here would be no point to the carefully crafted provisions of Section
145 spelling out the permissible scope of indemnification under Dela-
ware law if subsection (f) allowed indemnification in additional circum-
stances without regard to these limits. The exception would swallow the
rule.
Id. (quoting Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 307, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part by 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996)). Instead,
the court refused to ignore the explicit terms of the statute holding that any at-
tempt to provide additional rights to indemnification under subsection (f) must be
consistent with the other provisions of the statute. Id. Accordingly, the court de-
nied Waltuch's claim that Article Ninth of Conti's certificate provided for indemni-
fication even if he acted in bad faith because to so hold would be inconsistent with
section 145(a)'s requirement of "good faith." Id. at 94.
163. For a discussion of mandatory indemnification under § 145(c), see supra
notes 113-35 and accompanying text. Waltuch argued that because he had been
dismissed with prejudice without any payment or assumption of liability, he had
been "successful on the merits or otherwise" as required by subsection (c) and was
entitled to indemnification as a matter of law. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 95. Conti re-
sponded by arguing that Waltuch had not been successful because part of the $35
million it paid in settlement was paid "on behalf of Waltuch." Id. Conti argued
that "success" under subsection (c) was synonymous with "vindication" requiring
an element of moral exoneration. Id. The district court agreed with Conti and
summarized the argument:
Vindication is ... ordinarily associated with a dismissal with prejudice
without any payment. However, a director or officer is not vindicated
when the reason he did not have to make a settlement payment is be-
cause someone else assumed that liability. Being bailed out is not the
same thing as being vindicated.
Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 311.
164. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 95.
165. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
166. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 95 (citing Wolfson, 321 A.2d at 138). For a further
discussion of the Wolfson case, see supra notes 129, 132.
167. Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit noted that the court in Wolf-
son "rejected the more expansive view of vindication" or moral exoneration urged
by the corporation in that case, which was similar to that urged by Conti. Id.
44
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under § 145(c) has to ask is what the result in the underlying litigation
was, not why it was.' 6 8
Applying the Wolfson principles, the Second Circuit determined that
Waltuch was entitled to indemnification under § 145(c).169 The court
concluded that when the suits against Waltuch were dismissed with preju-
dice without any payment or assumption of liability on his part, he had
been "successful on the merits or otherwise" as that term is used in the
statute. 170 The court rejected Conti's contention that Waltuch did not
truly achieve a settlement without payment because part of Conti's $35
million settlement was paid on behalf of Waltuch.' 7' According to the
court, Conti's argument was inconsistent with Wolfson because it required
the court "to go behind the result" and inquire as to why the suits were
dismissed, an endeavor the court deemed expressly prohibited by
Wolfson.172
The court found additional support for its narrow definition of "suc-
cess" in the fact that technical defenses are considered sufficient to satisfy
the "success on the merits or otherwise" requirement of § 145(c).' 7 3 The
court noted that in such cases a defendant who has successfully asserted a
technical defense to an underlying action is deemed "successful" under
the statute irrespective of whether that victory would have been deserved
had there been an adjudication on the merits. 174 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that it should not matter whether Waltuch would have prevailed
on the merits in the absence of Conti's settlement because, as in the case
of the technical defense, Waltuch was "successful," as that term is used in
the statute, regardless of whether his success was deserving.1 75
Finally, the court noted that its holding was consistent with the deci-
sions of two non-Delaware courts interpreting virtually identical
mandatory indemnification statutes. 176 Both decisions support the propo-
sition that dismissal of a suit with prejudice without any payment or as-
168. Id. at 96 ("According to [Wolfson], the only question a court may ask is
what the result was, not why it was.").
169. Id. at 97.
170. Id. at 96 ("Here, Waltuch was sued, and the suit was dismissed without his
having paid a settlement.... Once Waltuch had achieved his settlement gratis, he
achieved success 'on the merits or otherwise."' (emphasis added)).
171. Id.
172. Id. ("Under the approach taken in [ Wolfson], it is not our business to ask
why this result was reached.").
173. Id. For a discussion of technical defenses as a means to establishing suc-
cess under § 145(c), see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
174. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 96.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir.
1978); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979)). For a
discussion of Wisener, see infra note 177. For a discussion of B & B Inv. Club, see
infra notes 177-78.
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sumption of liability constitutes "success" as used in the statute. 177
Furthermore, both decisions supported the court's conclusion that
§ 145(c) is satisfied when a defendant has been "successful" irrespective of
how that success was achieved or whether it would have been deserving on
the merits.17 8 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision
and granted Waltuch indemnification for the expenses he incurred in de-
fending the private actions. 179
B. A Critical Analysis of the Second Circuit's Decision in
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.
1. The Second Circuit's "Rule of Consistency"
The Second Circuit's holding that any attempt to provide additional
indemnification rights under § 145(f) must be consistent with the other
substantive provisions of § 145 is solidly correct.' 8 0 Virtually every applica-
ble source of authority on the issue appears to unanimously support the
court's "rule of consistency."' 8 1 Moreover, a common sense reading of
§ 145 as a whole clearly demonstrates that an alternative construction is
logically inconsistent.
While the case law on subsection (f) is sparse, the court correctly as-
serted that statements in the applicable decisions on Delaware law tend to
support the court's "rule of consistency." 182 Additionally, commentators
177. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 97. In Wisener, the Second Circuit interpreted an
Illinois statute identical to § 145(c) and concluded that the term "success on the
merits or otherwise ... surely is broad enough to cover a termination of claims by
agreement without any payment or assumption of liability." Wisener, 583 F.2d at
583. In B & B Investment Club, the district court concluded that when an officer
"negotiate(d] a dismissal with prejudice without making any payment... [he or
shej was 'successful on the merits or otherwise."' B & B Inv. Club, 472 F. Supp. at
791. Accordingly, Waltuch was entitled to indemnification because the suits were
dismissed with prejudice without any payment or assumption of liability on his
part. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 97.
178. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 97. The decision of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in B & B Investment Club was also consistent
with the Second Circuit's conclusion and its interpretation of Wisener. In B & B
Investment Club, an officer sought mandatory indemnification for expenses in-
curred in a suit from which he was dismissed with prejudice and without any pay-
ment on his part. B & B Inv. Club, 472 F. Supp. at 791. Nonetheless, his dismissal
without payment was only possible because a co-defendant had paid a large
amount to the plaintiff in settlement. Id,
179. Waltuch, 88 F.Sd at 97. In short, the court concluded that "[w]hatever
the impetus for the plaintiffs' dismissal of their claims against Waltuch, he still
walked away without liability and without making a payment. This constitutes a
success that is not tarnishedby the process that achieved it." Id.
180. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis in Waltuch, see supra
notes 136-62 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of these sources of authority, see supra notes 88-89, infra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
182. For examples of case law supporting the court's "rule of consistency," see
generally Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953);
Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 823 (Del. 1992); Hibbert v.
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on Delaware law resoundingly agree that subsection (f) is limited by public
policy and the other substantive provisions of the statute.' 83 Moreover,
the principal drafter of the 1967 revisions to § 145 has endorsed this view
as well.' 8 4
The appropriateness of the court's holding is perhaps most clearly
illustrated by examining the consequences of accepting the alternative ar-
gument. If subsection (f) is indeed a separate plenary grant of power to
corporations to indemnify in any manner they see fit, then it would appear
that the enactment of the other provisions of the statute was a pure act of
legislative futility. 185 There would be no point to incorporating a good
faith requirement or distinguishing between third party and derivative
suits if a corporation could simply agree to provide unlimited indemnifica-
tion to its directors and officers through the impetus of subsection (f).186
In short, the district court appropriately summarized the fatal flaw in Wal-
Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344 (Del. 1983); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 593-94 & n.19 (Del. Ch. 1994); Choate, Hall & Stewart
v. SCA Servs., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). But see PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
183. For a discussion of limitations upon § 145(0, see supra notes 100-12 and
accompanying text. Generally, commentators agree that subsection (f) is not an
unlimited plenary grant of power to indemnify, but rather that it is limited by
public policy constraints. See Arsht, supra note 5, at 176 (noting that "[t]he statu-
tory language [of subsection (f)] is circumscribed by limits of public policy");
Sparks et al., supra note 3, at 975 ("[P]ublic policy limits the power to indemnify
under Section 145(0."). Furthermore, most commentators agree that subsections
(a) through (e) represent an affirmative statement of Delaware's public policy on
corporate indemnification. BALo-ri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 198-99
(noting that other provisions could bar certain uses of subsection (f)); Klink et al.,
supra note 5, at 128(noting that substantive provisions of section are statement of
public policy). Therefore, commentators believe that attempts to provide supple-
mentary indemnification rights under subsection (f) are valid only in so far as they
are consistent with the public policy embodied in subsections (a) through (e) of
the statute.
184. See geeraUy Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 77-80 (discussing legisla-
ture's intent behind 1967 revisions to § 146). According to Arsht & Stapleton, the
legislature amended § 145 because it "decided that the power to indemnify should
not be granted unless it appeared that the person seeking indemnification had
'acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation."' Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
185. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 91-94 (2d Cir.
1996) (arguing that § 145(0 is not separate plenary grant of power to corporations
to indemnify in any manner); see also Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 833
F. Supp. 302, 306-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (arguing similarly), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by
88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
186. Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 92. An interpretation that would nullify the explicit
"good faith" and "best interests" requirements would violate the leislative intent
behind the statute. See Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 56, at 77-78 (discussing legis-
lative intent behind 1967 revision to add "good faith" and "best interests" require-
ments to § 145). These requirements were intentionally added to limit the power
of corporations to indemnify for breaches of fiduciary duties. Id. To interpret
subsection (f) as a plenary grant of indemnification power would be to abrogate
the legislative intent behind the statute. Id.
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tuch's argument when it wrote that under Waltuch's premise, subsection
(f) would become the proverbial "exception that swallowed the rule," ren-
dering the remainder of the statue utterly meaningless.' 87
As a final observation, it is worth noting that a growing number of
other states have codified "rules of consistency" in their indemnification
statutes.188 These statutes recognize that a corporation may agree to give
directors and officers other rights to indemnification, but declare that any
such agreement is valid only to the extent that they are consistent with the
other provisions of the statute.' 8 9 In light of this practice, it is within the
realm of possibility that the Delaware Legislature simply failed to include
the obvious and that the Second Circuit was called upon in Waltuch to
clarify and fill in the gap.
2. The Second Circuit's Test for "Success"
The Second Circuit's holding that a dismissal of an entire suit with
prejudice without any payment or assumption of liability satisfies the "suc-
cess on the merits or otherwise" requirement of § 145(c) also appears to
be well-grounded in both case law and commentary surrounding
§ 145 (c).19 0 The court, following the Delaware precedent in Wolfson, logi-
cally reasoned that if a complete success in the criminal context was suffi-
cient to trigger mandatory indemnification in that case, then a complete
success should operate similarly in the civil context. 191 Because the dis-
missal with prejudice of an entire suit without payment by the indemnitee
is a complete success in a civil suit, the court's conclusion that Waltuch was
entitled to indemnification stands firmly on precedent.192 Moreover, the
court's decision on this issue was anticipated in the commentary on § 145
187. Waltuch, 833 F. Supp. at 309.
188. For examples of states with consistency provisions in their indemnifica-
tion statutes, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-778 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-580(a)
(Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-509(3) (1996); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. art. 2.02-1(M) (West 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.590(1) (West
1995).
189. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.590(I). Section 23B.08.590(1)
provides:
A provision treating a corporation's indemnification of or advance for
expenses to directors that is contained in its articles of incorporation,
bylaws, [or] a resolution of its shareholders or board of directors, or in a
contract or otherwise, is valid only if and to the extent the provision is
consistent with [the provisions of this statute].
Id.
190. For a discussion of § 145(c), see supra notes 113-35 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's construction of subsection (c), see
supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
191. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974) (finding dismissal of criminal counts to be "success on the merits
or otherwise" as used in section 145(c)). For further discussion of Wolfson, see
supra notes 129, 132.
192. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 n.12 (2d Cir.
1996) (comparing criminal absolute success in criminal and civil actions).
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and was consistent with decisions on the same issue in other
jurisdictions.19 3
The court's bright-line test for "success" also appears to find support
in Delaware precedent. The Delaware Superior Court's opinion in Wolfson
clearly supports the court's conclusion that indemnification under
§ 145(c) is solely contingent upon a claimant's success in the underlying
action regardless of how or why that success was achieved. 194 This test is
also consistent with the holding of the Delaware Superior Court in Green v.
Westcap Corp.195 that a claimant's successful defense of an entire criminal
action on the merits was sufficient to entitle the claimant to indemnifica-
tion under subsection (c).196 In Westcap, like Wolfson, the court refused to
go behind the result of the underlying proceeding to determine whether
the claimant's success was deserved. 19 7
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE WAKE OF
WALTUCH v. CONTICOMMODITY SERvs., INC.
In the wake of Waltuch, corporate attempts to provide supplementary
indemnification rights to their directors and officers under subsection (f)
are clearly circumscribed by the other substantive provisions of the stat-
ute.198 After Waltuch, it is settled that corporations may not, for instance,
depend upon subsection (f) to indemnify directors and officers in the ab-
193. See Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1978)
(construing Illinois statute's success on merits or otherwise requirement as broad
enough to encompass termination of claims by agreement without payment); B &
B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding dis-
missal of suit with prejudice without payment constitutes success under Penn-
sylvania statute); BALoTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.13, at 186 (noting
dismissal of suit with prejudice without payment constitutes success under
§ 145(c)); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.04 (same); Beveridge, supra note 51,
at 751 (same); Monteleone & Conca, supra note 5, at 575 (same); Veasey et al.,
supra note 2, at 406-07 (same). For a further discussion of what constitutes success
under § 145(c), see supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
194. Wolfson, 321 A.2d at 141.
195. 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
196. Id. at 262. It is important to note that Westcap, like Wolfson, involved
claims for mandatory indemnification that arose out of the criminal context and
not the civil context. Id.
197. Id. at 266. In Westcap, the officer successfully defended against all crimi-
nal claims against him and sought indemnification under § 145(c). Id. at 262.
The corporation refused to grant indemnification, claiming that the officer was
required to show good faith as in subsections (a) and (b). Id. at 264. The court
rejected the corporation's argument, refused to inquire as to the officer's good
faith and found that the successful defense alone was all that was needed to entitle
the officer to indemnification under § 145(c). Id. at 265. Notably, the claims in
both Westcap and Wolfson arose out of the criminal context where the lines between
success and failure are clearly defined. For a discussion of the difference between
the criminal and civil contexts for purposes of § 145(c), see infra notes 205-07 and
accompanying text.
198. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1996).
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sence of good faith. 199 Nonetheless, while the court's new "rule of consis-
tency" places definitive limits upon subsection (f), it does not render
subsection (f) meaningless. 200 That section may still be used to provide
additional rights to indemnification as long as those rights are consistent
with the rest of the section.
2 01
The court's decision with respect to subsection (c) may prove to have
significant practical importance to corporate practitioners. Waltuch con-
clusively establishes that a dismissal with prejudice of an entire civil action
without payment satisfies § 145(c).20 2 Most notably, the court's decision
should be consulted by corporations contemplating settlements in actions
in which they are co-defendants with a director or officer. In the wake of
Waltuch, corporations should seriously consider making the director or of-
ficer contribute toward the settlement in order to avoid liability for their
expenses in a subsequent indemnification action brought by such director
or officer under § 145(c) citing Waltuch as precedent.2 0 3
It should be noted that the applicability of the court's decision to a
civil action where less than the entire suit has been dismissed without pay-
ment remains unsettled. 20 4 This would be the case, for example, where a
199. Id. at 94.
200. See id. (discussing expansions of indemnification under subsection (f) as
consistent with § 145); see also Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344
(Del. 1983) (listing "other rights" to indemnification consistent with statute and
public policy); BAioTri & FINx.STEIN, supra note 5, § 4.16, at 198-200.1 (discuss-
ing permissible expansions of indemnification under subsection (f)); KNEPPER &
BAuLEY, supra note 2, at 308-09 (listing expansions of indemnification under subsec-
tion (f) consistent with statute and public policy); Veasey et al., supra note 2, at
415-16 (listing expansions of indemnification under subsection (f) consistent with
statute and public policy).
201. See Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 91 (announcing "rule of 'consistency"').
202. Id. at 95. For a discussion of the court's holding with respect to § 145(c),
see supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second
Circuit's construction of subsection (c), see supra notes 190-97 and accompanying
text.
203. See Waltuch 88 F.3d at 87 (holding officer successful where suits were
dismissed without payment). The court repeatedly stressed that Waltuch had es-
caped without making any payment. Id. Had Conti required Waltuch to contrib-
ute toward settlement, or assume some liability in the settlement, then Conti would
have been spared having to later pay Waltuch's $1.2 million in legal fees. This is
especially true in light of the fact that Waltuch did not even bother to appeal the
district court's denial of his claim for expenses in the CFTC proceeding because
he had paid a $100,000 fine in that case, making him clearly unsuccessful for pur-
poses of § 145(c). See id. (noting Waltuch did not appeal district court's denial of
mandatory indemnification for CFTC proceeding); Waltuch v. Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 302, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying Waltuch's claim for
mandatory indemnification of expenses in CFTC proceeding because he paid
fine).
204. See Waltuch, 88 F.3d at 96 n.12 (noting that case involved dismissal of
entire suit without payment as opposed to dismissal with partial payment). The
Second Circuit explicitly noted the difficulties with applying its opinion beyond
the facts presented:
Our adoption of [ Wolfson's] interpretation of the statutory term "success-
ful" does not necessarily signal our endorsement of the result in that case.
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/5
settlement results in a dismissal of claims accompanied by partial payment
for some claims but not others.20 5 Such cases involve significantly more
complex legal issues than those presented in Waltuch, and accordingly, fu-
ture courts should resist the temptation to mechanically apply Waltuch
under such circumstances. 20 6 Instead, future courts should narrowly con-
The [ Wolfson] court sliced the case into individual counts, with indemnifi-
cation pegged to each count independently of the others. We are not
faced with a case in which the corporate officer claims to have been "suc-
cessful" on some parts of the case but was clearly "unsuccessful" on
others, and therefore take no position on this feature of the [Wolfson]
holding.... In a criminal case, conviction on a particular count is obvi-
ous failure, and dismissal of the charge is obvious success. In a civil suit
for damages, however, there is a monetary continuum between complete
success (dismissal of the suit without any payment) and complete failure
(payment of the full amount of damages requested by the plaintiff). Be-
cause Waltuch made no payment in connection with the dismissal of the
suits against him, we need not decide whether a defendant's settlement
payment automatically renders that defendant "unsuccessful" under
145(c).
Id. The Second Circuit reasoned analogically that if complete success in the crimi-
nal context was sufficient to trigger mandatory indemnification in Wolfson, then it
should operate similarly in the civil context. Thus, in Waltuch's case, there was an
absolute analogical match between complete success on both sides of the equa-
tion. Problems in applying the court's analysis arise, however, as one travels along
the spectrum in civil suits where there is no longer an analogical match to reason
from.
205. See id. (acknowledging difficulty in applying § 145(c) to settlements of
civil actions with partial payment). An example of such a situation would be: P
sues D, director of C corporation, alleging five claims based upon misconduct by D
that was indisputably performed in bad faith. P and D then enter a settlement
agreement expressly providing that P will dismiss all five claims and D assumes
liability for only one. D then sues Cfor mandatory indemnification under § 145(c)
for the four claims he technically dismissed without payment. This would be an
example of a case along the continuum of civil success described by the court. For
a discussion of the complex issues that arise in determining "success" in the civil
context, see supra note 204.
206. For a hypothetical illustrating this point, see supra note 205. Under a
wooden application of Waltuch, D would prevail and the court would be precluded
from "going behind the result" to determine his success. This would be the case
even though it clearly undermines the public policy behind the statute's other
substantive provisions. For example, if D sought permissive indemnification under
a provision in Cs by-laws or certificate it would be denied because D acted in bad
faith. Waltuch, 88 F.Sd at 92. Nonetheless, under the one-dimensional test of
Waltuch, D would be entitled to indemnification under subsection (c) notwith-
standing his undisputed bad faith because the court would be prevented from
looking "behind the result" to determine whether the dismissal was deserved. Id.
It seems fundamentally inconsistent to hold that a statute prohibits corporations
from indemnifying an individual who has acted in bad faith while at the same time
holding that the same statute requires corporations to indemnify an individual
who has acted in bad faith. Nonetheless, this is precisely the result under a strict
application of the court's analysis. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analy-
sis, see supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
While it is true that Green v. Westcap, 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985), held
that good faith is not needed under subsection (c), that case is easily distinguish-
able because it arose out of a criminal action in which the claimant had success-
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fine the holding in Waltuch to its facts and perform the appropriate in-
quiry to determine the claimant's success where it is less than complete. 20 7
Kurt A. Mayr, II
fully defended on the merits. See id. at 264 (holding director successful in defense
was entitled to indemnification and was not required to establish good faith or
reasonable belief). The court noted that where there had been a prior adjudica-
tion on the merits, it was not necessary to prove good faith for the purposes of
subsection (c). Id. at 265. For a further discussion of Westcap, see supra note 134.
In the case of D, however, there has been no such prior determination.
207. Applying Waltuch's bright-line test would allow defendants to structure
settlements to create the illusion of success in order to optimize indemnification
opportunities secure in the knowledge that a subsequent court will not review
those settlements to determine their content or motivation. The better view would
be to confine the application of Waltuch exclusively to those cases which fit within
the scope of "complete success" on the civil litigation continuum (i.e., dismissal of
the entire suit without payment), and allow the court to "look behind the result"
and perform a deeper inquiry in cases that are not clearly "complete successes."
Many states have avoided the problems posed by partial indemnification alto-
gether by only allowing mandatory indemnification where a claimant has been
"wholly" successful in defending the underlying suit. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
1-37-9 (Michie 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-52 (1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.02-1(H) (West 1996). As a final note, it is worth observing that in both
of the non-Delaware cases relied upon by the court, the entire actions were dis-
missed without payment, and as such, they can be characterized as "complete suc-
cesses" like Waltuch. See Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d
Cir. 1978); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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